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Abstract 
 
The European Enlightenment secured man’s freedom from doctrinal 
thought. Scientific progress and technological innovation flourished in 
the 18th Century, radically changing the lives of all. Man’s mastery and 
transformation of his environment was matched by revolutionary 
political reform, resulting in the dissolution of empire and the transfer 
of power into the hands of the people. Social transformation saw the 
city-states of pre-modern man supplanted by a globalized community 
whose existence grew from time and space distantiation facilitated by 
the new technologies and the development of symbolic forms. These 
sweeping social, political and ideological changes of the 18th Century 
fostered the belief that man’s transformative authority was indeed his 
to command. Man believed he had a right to self-governance and to 
autonomous decision-making. Kant described moral autonomy as the 
freedom men have to show rational accountability for their actions and 
he saw in men a dignity beyond all price because of this moral 
autonomy. Personal autonomy is seen as the expression of the free will 
of individuals and is justifiably constrained by the need to respect the 
interests and agency of others. The principle of autonomy, in the 
context of medical practice, was not clearly articulated until the early 
20th century. Prior to this, the ethical practice of medicine relied upon 
the beneficent intentions of the practitioners.  The limits to patient 
autonomy have been delineated largely by issues of social justice 
based upon the need to share scarce resources fairly among members 
of society. However, autonomy remains a dominant principle and is 
most clearly exemplified by the process of informed consent obtained 
prior to any medical intervention. This thesis provides a conceptual 
analysis of autonomy in the context of informed consent. Following 
this, several different clinical scenarios are examined for evidence of 
justifiable limitations to patient autonomy. Each scenario is examined 
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in the light of different moral theories including deontology, 
utilitarianism, communitarianism and principlist ethical reasoning. 
Kantian ethical reasoning is found to be resilient in rejecting any 
limitation to the autonomy principle whereas each of the other theories 
allow greater scope for morally-justified curtailment of individual 
autonomy. The thesis concludes with reflection on post-modern society 
in which the radicalization of what began with the European 
Enlightenment sees the transformation of pre-modern society into a 
global community in which epistemological certainty is no longer 
available. In this environment, the emerging emphasis on global 
responsibility requires ethical accountability, not only when individuals 
secure transactions between one another but also between individuals 
and unknown  communities of men and women of current and future 
generations. The thesis concludes that patient autonomy is justifiably 
limited in South African medical practice because of issues related to 
social justice but that the impact of the new genetic technologies and 
post-modernity itself may in future set new limits to individual patient 
autonomy.  
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Abstrak 
 
Die Europese Verligting het die mensdom bevry van verstarde, 
dogmatiese denke. Wetenskaplike en tegnologiese ontwikkelinge het 
tydens the 18de Eeu die lewens van almal radikaal verander.  Die 
mens se bemeestering en transformasie van sy omgewing het gepaard 
gegaan met revolusionêre politieke hervormings wat gelei het tot die 
ontbinding van tradisionele politieke ryke en die oordrag van mag aan 
die mens. Sosiale transformasie het veroorsaak dat die politieke 
ordeninge van voor-moderne mense deur ‘n globale gemeenskap 
vervang is wat ontstaan het as gevolg van onder meer die 
ontkoppeling van tyd en plek (Giddens), en wat deur nuwe 
tegnologiese ontwikkelings en die ontstaan van simboliese vorms 
moontlik gemaak is. Hierdie uitgebreide ontwikkelinge het die idee laat 
ontstaan dat niks vir die 18de Eeuse mens onmoontlik is nie. Die mens 
het geglo dat hy ‘n reg het op self-bestuur en outonome besluite. Kant 
het die morele outonomie van die mens beskou as sy vryheid om 
verantwoordlikheid te neem vir sy eie rasioneel-begronde handelinge 
en verder het hy ‘n besondere waardigheid in die mens geïdentifiseer 
vanweë sy morele outonomie. Omdat ‘n mens hierdie eienskap besit, 
beskik hy oor ‘n hoër waardigheid as alle alle ander lewensvorme. 
Persoonlike outonomie is die uitoefenimg van die vrye wil van die 
individu en word om geregverdigde redes beperk deur die regte van 
ander mense. Die beginsel van outonomie met verwysing na mediese 
etiek het nie voor die begin van die 20ste eeu prominent geword nie. 
Voor hierdie tyd het mediese etiek staatgemaak op die goeie voorneme 
van die praktisyn. Die grense van individuele outonomie word nou 
bepaal deur die noodsaak van sosiale geregtigheid. Al is dit die geval, 
bly die beginsel van outonomie die belangrikste beginsel in die etiese 
debat en word meestal gesien as ‘n deel van die proses van ingeligte 
toestemming. Hierdie tesis verskaf ‘n omvattende ontleding van 
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outonomie met betrekking tot ingeligte toestemming. Daarna word 
verskillende kliniese gevalle beskryf en ontleed, en verskeie etiese 
teorieë gebruik om die wyse waarop pasiënt outonomie reverdigbaar 
ingekort behoort te word, te bespreek.  Die teorie van Kant is in staat 
om enige inkorting van outonomie in alle gevalle the weerstaan. 
Elkeen van die ander teorieë verskaf redes waarom die outonomie van 
individuele pasiënte legitiem ingekort mag word. Hierdie werk sluit af 
met besinning oor die post-moderne gemeenskap wat ‘n  globale 
samelewing moet aanvaar sowel as die ontoereikenheid van enige 
kenteoretiese sekerheid. Die ontwikkelende verantwoordelikheid vir die 
totale mensdom in hierdie wêreld veroorsaak dat individue nie meer 
slegs moet besluit oor die morele verhouding met sy medemens nie, 
maar ook oor sy verhouding met mense van gemeenskappe wat geskei 
is in tyd en ruimte, insluitend sy verhouding met die mense van 
toekomstige generasies. Hierdie werk sluit af met die gevolgtrekking 
dat pasiënt outonomie regverdigbaar beperk word in die Suid 
Afrikaanse mediese praktyk deur die noodsaaklikheid van sosiale 
geregtigheid. Die verwagte impak van nuwe genetiese tegnologieë en 
die ontwikkeling van ‘n post-moderne gemeenskap mag nuwe 
beperkings bring vir pasiënt outonomie. 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction: Self-awareness, an 
Enlightenment notion 
 
The idea that individual autonomy should be regarded as the dominant 
precept in bioethical deliberation developed during the latter half of the 
20th Century. This idea supplanted a more traditional view that the 
practice of medicine should be based largely upon the beneficent 
intentions of doctors. Respect for the autonomously-expressed wishes 
of the individual was philosophically consistent with the Enlightenment 
ideal of individual sovereignty and the exposition of Human Rights, 
articulated since the 18th Century. Today, the choices made by 
individuals seeking medical care are often regarded as being 
paramount. Yet, in any society of women and men, autonomy cannot 
be seen as an unlimited right to pursue one’s own self-interest. 
Individual autonomy is justifiably limited in various circumstances and 
the ethical basis for limiting autonomy may be derived from ethical 
theories rooted in modernity. In addition to the arguments based upon 
deontological and utilitarian theory, the contemporary awareness of 
environmental degradation and persistent global poverty amidst great 
wealth has resurrected a communitarian ethic which also resonates 
with African communitarian philosophy in the form of Ubuntu. An ethic 
of responsibility for both the current and future global community has 
thus developed and created its own limits to the autonomously-
enacted will of the individual. This thesis seeks to describe some of the 
ethical argument that may be employed in describing the justifiable 
limitations applicable to patient autonomy in contemporary South 
African medical practice. The text begins with a description of how the 
Enlightenment established the idea that man was master of his own 
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destiny and how sweeping changes in his social and political 
environment fostered his belief in himself to the point that nothing 
seemed to lie beyond his control. The second chapter deals with the 
notion of self-governance or autonomy and then moves on to describe 
the paradigm biomedical example of autonomous action contained by 
the precept of informed consent. The fourth chapter outlines a number 
of different scenarios in which some limitation of autonomy may be 
justified in terms of Kantian, utilitarian, communitarian and principlist 
ethical theory. The final chapter considers the evidence in favour of 
justifiable restrictions to patient autonomy and also examines some of 
the more recent challenges presented by a “post-modern” society in 
which a globalised perspective induces accountability, not only for 
transactions taking place between individuals living in the same 
community, but also for those that may influence communities of men 
and women whose lives are lived at some distance (of both space and 
time) from our own.      
To establish why the idea of self-governance became the dominant 
principle of bioethics during the 20th Century, it is necessary to 
examine some aspects of the European Enlightenment which served to 
foster man’s belief in himself as an individual endowed with a limitless 
capacity for taking control of every aspect of his life and using it to 
further his own ends1.   
The events of the 18th Century, in particular, changed man’s 
perceptions of life radically; the lives of European individuals were 
transformed in every dimension imaginable: man’s capacity to 
understand his environment, his mastery of technology, the expansion 
of sovereignty through exploration of distant lands together with social 
and political reforms heralded hitherto unprecedented changes in the 
                                                            
1
 In the text of this document “man” is frequently used to refer to humankind of both genders. This is 
done without any intention to discriminate between male or female gender in any way and attributes no 
greater status to one gender over the other. It also implies no disrespect for either gender. Similar 
considerations are applicable to the terms “himself” and “herself” throughout this text.  
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lives of individuals. This transformation happened so rapidly that the 
life of an individual man could not escape an awareness of the changes 
taking place all around him.  
These changes were imprinted on the psyche of modern man leaving 
him with a sense of mastery; “enlightenment” encompassed the sense 
that the Sun had broken through the gloom of the Middle Ages leaving 
man free, rational and (most importantly of all), seemingly 
omnipotent. Man’s belief in himself became his defining creed and his 
own omnipotence always implied the necessity for individual freedom.  
The European Enlightenment began with the refutation of doctrinal 
authority; in particular, Copernicus and Galileo established that the 
Earth was not the centre of the Universe but merely a “grain of dust 
amid countless others” (Barth 1976: 37). This discovery founded upon 
empirical observation and man’s capacity for rationality set aside the 
authority of the Church and opened the door leading down the path of 
scientific discovery. The philosophy of this time has been described by 
Barth (1973: 39) in the following terms: 
“(Man)... began to be conscious – and more forcibly than before – of a 
capacity for thinking which was responsible to no other authority than 
himself. This free thought he once more finds related to nature which was 
just as freely observed. Mathematics were once more discovered by him to 
be the bridge which carried him across in both directions, from concept to 
intuition, from intuition to concept. Logic, observation and mathematics 
were the three decisive elements of the absolute power now disclosed in 
science.”      
Barth (1973: 40) further observes that the pursuit of scientific 
endeavour became separated from the Universities in the 18th Century 
and became the endeavour of all:  
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“...the human capacity for acquiring knowledge, which had been so long 
neglected, now began to spread in every sphere like a stream running along 
dry beds, and produced a movement from whose influence no clear mind 
could withdraw.”  
The scale of these events can be measured in the realization that every 
science can trace its roots back to the Eighteenth Century and each 
technology that followed in the wake of scientific enquiry radically 
changed the lives of all. The steam cylinder was invented in 1690, 
steam heat appeared 55 years later and the steam engine less than 
ten years after that. Galvani discovered electricity in 1780 and gas was 
used for lighting soon after this. Spinning machines were made in 
1738; beet-sugar was produced in 1747; the mercury thermometer 
was discovered in 1714. Each of these inventions transformed the lives 
of individuals in startling ways. Barth (1973: 41) has encapsulated 
what this meant to the man of the 18th Century: 
“If we are to understand the feeling of life which surged through the whole 
of Europe, we must not underestimate the significance of the hopeful 
excitement which was also stirred by these discoveries too; here too is 
manifested the existence of the absolute man, the man almost capable of 
anything”     
Not only were transformative events shaping the everyday world of 
individuals at this time but simultaneously socio-political upheaval also 
saw the revolutionary transfer of political power into the hands of 
individuals. The structure of emperors and empires gave way to a new 
order brought about by the French and American Revolutions. 
Following the demise of hierarchical authority (under whose banner no 
single social class could lay any claim to dominance), power came to 
be devolved to social classes who were able to determine the law of 
the state. The first to seize power and declare their authority to be that 
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of the state were the princes. This has been described as the 
revolution from above that followed the dissolution of the empire. The 
princes exercised their absolute authority at the expense of the nobility 
and the middle classes – a situation exemplified by the rule of Louis IV 
and his offspring; this situation was destined to change because of 
economic and educational transformation.  
Machine-based industry expanded steadily during the eighteenth 
century, gradually displacing the agrarian economies of the old order. 
This growth in industry was accompanied by a rapid growth in 
population that provided labor for the industrialized economies; at the 
same time, currency reforms took hold with the development of central 
banks to control the issue of paper money (Craig 1971: 5). Land, 
previously seen as the basis for social organization, was displaced by 
capital and because of this the old divisions of society began to 
crumble. A bourgeoisie middle-class whose existence was based upon 
the manipulation and accumulation of money emerged and grew; they 
exercised economic power and sought both political and social 
influence, espousing liberal ideas. Beneath the bourgeoisie were the 
lower classes who provided labour in the new society. Labour, seen as 
a commodity to be bought and sold in market transactions, not 
surprisingly spawned political instincts among the lower classes that 
were focused on finding political power and securing economic welfare 
by means of a socialism that held governments responsible for 
improving their lot (Craig 1971: 6). 
Education, meanwhile, became more generally available because the 
industrial revolution allowed the mass production of cheap books and 
urbanization concentrated people in the cities. Among the educated 
classes, classicism was displaced by romanticism which also heralded 
greater freedom of expression (Craig 1971: 7). These two factors, 
economic and educational transformation, led to the revolution from 
below that saw political power being transferred from the governing 
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princes into the hands of representatives of the proletariat. The 
ideology of revolutionary change was encapsulated by the declaration 
of Universal Human and Civil rights ratified by the French National 
Assembly in August 1789, which had been preceded some 13 years 
earlier by a similar statement contained in the American Declaration of 
Independence. The equality of men and their “inalienable” rights to 
freedom, the possession of property and security are also reflected in 
American quest for “Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”. 
Governments were from now on seen as agents of the people whose 
task it was to protect the rights of individuals and whose existence 
would be regarded as legitimate only for as long as they continued to 
serve these ends and to act with the consent of the governed.  
Thus the transition from empire via the absolute authority of the 
princes was seen to come to an “ultimate reality” which was the 
concept of the state consisting of the sum of the individuals forming a 
nation (Barth 1973: 50). The opinion of individuals within the ruling 
sector of society became inviolable. Barth (1973: 53) has argued that 
this political transition reflected Hobbes’s philosophy (1660: chapter 
XXI) that man’s nature is restrained by his reason and his desire to 
preserve himself. He adopts self-imposed restrictions on his liberty by 
ceding some of his rights to the State which in turn guarantees his 
safety by exercising power over all within the State (Hobbes 1660: 
chapter XXI). The authority of the State could be vested in the 
monarchy, the aristocracy or a democracy; the public law determined 
by the State defined both right and wrong and was binding upon every 
citizen’s conscience, but it was the individual who remained sovereign 
over the state by choosing to cede certain rights while still retaining 
the right to remove any government that failed to act in accordance 
with his desire for safety and happiness.  
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The absolute authority of eighteenth century man was shown not only 
in his growing mastery of his environment through technological 
invention, but it emerged also in his burgeoning political power and 
growing intellectual stature fostered by the rapid spread of education. 
Barth extends this metaphor of man’s mastery of his world into aspects 
of Eighteenth Century culture. He describes 18th Century man as 
imposing his notion of form upon all manner of objects around him. In 
doing so he gave expression to his belief in himself as one whose 
knowledge of what was “intrinsically right, fitting (and) worthy” was to 
be taken for granted (Barth 1976: 55). This self-belief resonated in his 
manipulation of nature into geometrical forms which he further 
adorned with architectural structures in pursuit of beauty - such as the 
Palace at Versailles. His architecture also sought to transpose natural 
materials into forms of his making and his cities imposed themselves 
upon the environment rather than being built in accommodation of the 
geography of the land. Barth (1997: 56) writes: 
“What other age has dared to make architecture of its inmost heart to the 
extent that this one did? But this was an age which simply had to, for its 
inmost heart was precisely this idea of man as one taking hold of everything 
about him and subjecting it to his will” 
His dress code too showed similar adherence to form, even at the 
expense of his own discomfort. Eighteenth Century man projected a 
sartorial image of himself far nobler than his natural physique would 
ever have allowed. His study of history too became critical and self-
absorbed. He assumed the inviolability of his own standards, through 
the lens of which he judged all that had preceded him. The light of his 
convictions served to illuminate the darkness of the past and his “… 
sovereign will for form looked upon history, as it did upon nature, as 
just so much raw material.” (Barth 1997: 59).  
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Education became a cornerstone of eighteenth century culture because 
man believed too that he had command over his ability to introduce 
young people to real life based upon educational theories derived from 
the principles of Socratic dialogue together with the teaching of skills. 
The emphasis on education was overwhelming and government schools 
came into being in order to support education for all as a right and a 
duty. Freedom of association also emerged during the eighteenth 
century. The idea that men could form a community based upon free 
choice and common purpose created an entirely new structure around 
which orders of men were created. The associations of the past based 
upon marriage, family life and the professional association of the guild 
were supplanted by a new community that was regarded as being the 
“true, real and living” community. Barth (1997: 66) writes: 
“In spite of all the diversity of their forms it is impossible not to recognize 
the single unifying intention, spirit and conviction underlying all this building 
of free associations of feeling and aim: the conviction that it is possible to 
create a community.”  (The emphasis is mine) 
Hence, man’s absolute belief in himself found its expression in every 
walk of life. The world he inhabited was subject to his authority: he 
shaped its form, he controlled its environment and exercised his 
mastery in every sphere of life without exception, and nothing lay 
beyond his grasp.  
Given this environment, it is not difficult to see why a belief in self-
governance was to become the dominant and axiomatic principle of 
bioethics. The 18th century writings of Kant and the 19th century 
utilitarian liberalism of John Stuart Mill gave expression to the idea that 
man had a dignity and a value beyond all price and that the happiness 
of man was to be considered morally relevant. At the end of the 19th 
century, the ideas formulated by G.E. Moore (writing in Principia 
Ethica, published in 1903) and W. D. Ross (The Right and the Good, 
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published in 1930) added aspects of intuitionism to man’s notion of 
morality which subsequently led to Beauchamp and Childress’s (2001: 
405) recently-formulated principles of bioethics based upon four prima 
facie principles that include the need to respect the autonomous will of 
the individual. 
Although this self-belief may prove to have been illusory, the 
circumstances of modernity nevertheless swept away the old order so 
thoroughly that man may now be left with no option but to pursue his 
own ends based upon his belief in himself.  
Giddens (1991: 3) has outlined the consequences of modernity as an 
increasingly radicalized transformation of society derived from time 
and space distantiation. The combined consequences of mechanical 
time-keeping, the spread of the written word and distant exploration 
with mapping of the globe fostered a process whereby individuals and 
their communities were dis-embedded from one another as purely local 
communities, giving rise instead to restructuring “across indefinite 
spans of time-space” (Giddens 1991: 21). Symbolic tokens (e.g. 
money) and expert systems created links between individuals in ways 
that had not previously been possible and the utilization of these 
symbolic tokens required the exercise of trust. Trust became a 
necessary social innovation because man, absent in time and space 
from others whose lives and actions influenced his own, had to rely 
upon the validity of the guarantees inherent in the symbolic forms that 
linked his life with unknown others. That trust was seen to exist in the 
context of human activity which was “… socially created, rather than 
given in the nature of things or by divine influence” (Giddens 1991: 
34). Trust was inextricably linked to the notion of risk which was, in 
turn, seen to displace fortuna; it was  
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“….an alteration in the perception of determination and contingency, such 
that human moral imperatives, natural causes, and chance reign in place of 
religious cosmologies”. (Giddens 1991: 34) 
Individual man therefore found himself responsible for his own 
decisions and their consequences in an extended social context, very 
different to the confined relationships of pre-modern traditional 
cultures.  
The old order was also thoroughly dislodged not only by the pace and 
extent of social transformation that began in the 17th and 18th 
centuries but also in the continual process of reflexive change that was 
to follow in the wake of modernity. Traditional cultures had been slow 
to change and continuity was achieved by honoring the past and all its 
symbols which represented the experience of previous generations. 
The process of scientific method and the authority of rational enquiry 
brought with it an accumulation of knowledge that was held to be 
reflexively important to society as a way of controlling and improving 
the circumstances of all. This notion has been characterized by 
Giddens (1991: 39) as “deeply unsettling” because the expectation of 
greater knowledge leading to greater certainty went unfulfilled. He 
writes: 
“For when the claims of reason replaced those of tradition, they appeared to 
offer a sense of certitude greater than that provided by pre-existing dogma. 
But this idea only appears persuasive so long as we do not see that the 
reflexivity of modernity actually subverts reason, at any rate where reason is 
understood as the gaining of certain knowledge. Modernity is constituted in 
and through reflexively applied knowledge, but the equation of knowledge 
with certitude has turned out to be misconstrued.” (Giddens 1991: 39) 
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This lack of certainty was a consequence of the limitations of reason 
itself. Giddens (1991: 39) cites Karl Popper who argued that all science 
rested upon shifting sand.  
Giddens (1991: 39) writes: 
“In science nothing is certain, and nothing can be proved, even if scientific 
endeavour provides us with the most dependable information about the 
world to which we can aspire”  
He further adds: 
“No knowledge under conditions of modernity is knowledge in the ‘old’ 
sense, where ‘to know’ is to be certain”. (Giddens 1991: 40) 
Modern man, faced with the dissolution of pre-modern society entered 
the 18th Century invigorated by his apparent mastery of all around 
him; his world changed and continued to change as every element of 
pre-modernity was swept away. The society he once occupied became 
a global community, that which he once knew to be true was 
scrutinized in the light of reason and only practices authenticated by 
reason rather than tradition were held to be legitimate. These global 
and revolutionary changes in the circumstances of all communities 
were all derived from man’s rejection of doctrinal authority and his 
belief in the authority of individual rational enquiry. The scale of the 
change invoked by the advent of modernity allowed no retreat; man 
was confronted with choices that were of his own making and self-
governance replaced the old social context and the vagaries of fortuna. 
However, man’s control of society and nature was far from perfect; the 
dark side of modernity emerged during the following 300 years and 
included evidence of bureaucratic manipulation of individual creativity 
and autonomy, the creation of degrading and repetitive forms of 
labour, environmental degradation, the consolidated use of political 
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power leading to totalitarian rule, the creation and exercise of 
industrialized military power and the development of nuclear 
weaponry. More profoundly, however, modern man was confronted by 
his own limitations, especially in the scope and reach of reason itself. 
Giddens (1991: 48) observes: 
“Enlightenment thought, and Western culture in general, emerged from a 
religious context which emphasized teleology and the achievement of God’s 
grace.”   
He continues: 
“It is no way surprising that the advocacy of unfettered reason only 
reshaped the ideas of the providential, rather than displacing it. One type of 
certainty (divine law) was replaced by another (the certainty of our senses, 
of empirical observation), and divine providence was replaced by 
providential progress.” (Giddens 1991: 48) 
However, as Giddens continues to argue, the claims of reason were 
less than absolute: 
“Yet the seeds of nihilism were there in Enlightenment thought from the 
beginning. If the sphere of reason is wholly unfettered, no knowledge can 
rest upon an unquestioned foundation, because even the most firmly held 
notions can only be regarded as valid ‘in principle’ or ‘until further notice’.” 
(Giddens 1991: 48) 
The notion of the Sun breaking through the gloom of the Middle Ages 
was thus moved on in an unexpected way. The assurance and self-
belief of the Enlightenment now reflexively gave way to a more 
searching examination and self-governance had to be pursued without 
self-assurance. Giddens writes: 
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“Modernity turns out to be enigmatic at its core, and there seems no way in 
which this enigma can be ‘overcome’. We are left with questions where once 
there appeared to be answers, and I shall argue subsequently that it is not 
only philosophers who realize this. A general awareness of the phenomenon 
filters into anxieties which press in on everyone”. (Giddens 1991: 49) 
Despite this, self-governance and autonomy are Enlightenment ideals 
whose currency remains unchanged although the limitations to these 
ideals are emerging more clearly as modernity itself comes to terms 
with the consequences of the Enlightenment. 
Thus, with man’s belief in his own agency being one of the central 
tenets of the Enlightenment, this thesis will now examine the concept 
of self-governance before moving on to a consideration of the 
justifiable limitations to patient autonomy in contemporary South 
African medical practice. The last chapter addresses the impact of 
‘post-modernity’ on the concept of individual autonomy and the 
possibility that modernity itself has set limits to individual autonomy.      
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Chapter 2 
A conceptual analysis of autonomy 
The notion of autonomy 
Autonomy is commonly understood as the process of self-governance by 
means of which man expresses himself; it is his capacity to choose who 
he is, how he behaves and what he wishes to do. Since the advent of 
modernity, self-awareness has led man to believe he has a right to make 
decisions that are his own; this belief in the primacy of individual 
autonomy has become constitutive of man’s being and he now seeks 
freedom of choice in every aspect of his life: he chooses those with whom 
he wishes to associate, he chooses the career he wishes to pursue, he 
chooses the entertainment he seeks, he chooses the beliefs he elects to 
hold and he chooses the political rulers by whom he wishes to be 
governed. The exercise of autonomous choice has become the 
quintessential marker of man’s political freedom and respecting the 
individual’s right to freedom of choice is so far beyond question in 
contemporary western society that individual freedom of choice is usually 
taken for granted. In medicine, the concept of autonomy is enshrined by 
the process of informed consent which allows individual patients to choose 
between different therapeutic options; this freedom to choose is a process 
sometimes found to be in conflict with the beneficence-based views of 
medical practitioners who are, nevertheless, obliged to respect patient 
autonomy in almost all circumstances. 
Being free to make choices cannot be an unconditional freedom for any 
man living a social life. The interests and needs of others have to be 
weighed against the autonomously-declared desires and actions of the 
individual. Society proscribes autonomous actions that may harm others 
and also limits the choices offered to individuals in order to share 
resources fairly among everyone. In medicine, the need to protect society 
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from dangerous physical and mental illnesses may lead to interventions 
exercised against individuals without their consent; one example of such 
circumstance arises from the need to contain deadly epidemic diseases by 
means of quarantine measures and public health vaccination policies. 
Such interventions may lead to perceived infringements of individual 
autonomy. Another example of how autonomy may be overruled is to be 
seen in the way attempted suicide is dealt with by most civil institutions.  
Autonomy is thus a form of conditional freedom with apparent limits. 
Individual choice may be exercised in matters of specific material concern 
where the options exercised contain no inherent moral dilemma. A 
medical example might be that of a person called upon to decide whether 
or not to accept a particular course of chemotherapy to treat cancer. The 
moral content of such decision-making is to be found in the process by 
which such decisions are made (e.g. the process of obtaining informed 
consent) and issues of a just distribution of resources within society (e.g. 
should scarce medical resources be spent on treatment that has limited 
benefit?).  
Individual choice exercised in choosing the principles according to which 
others are to be treated are moral choices. Autonomy may thus be 
exercised both in matters of moral choice as well as in matters of 
personal preference. These types of autonomous choice may be called 
moral or personal autonomous choices and will be considered separately. 
The concept of moral autonomy 
Morality evades simple definition beyond that offered by Socrates, namely 
a process of reflection on how we ought to live2. Different ethical theories 
have provided more or less coherent answers to Socrates’ challenge of 
defining how we ought to live but it was the Enlightenment that led to the 
                                                            
2
 Plato reports the dialogue between Socrates and Thrasymachus in which he poses the question: “Is the 
attempt to determine the way of man’s life so small a matter in your eyes – to determine how life may be 
passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage?” The translation cited has been made by Benjamin 
Jowett and is available online at http://classics.mit.edu//Plato/republic.html. 
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idea of self-awareness and the possibility of individual choice. Since the 
Enlightenment, the significance of choosing between different options was 
no longer just a question of either complying or refraining from doing 
what was expected of you but became a choice of whether to pursue the 
good of man or not. The philosophical views of the absolute 18th Century 
man described in the preceding chapter were given expression in the 
writings of Immanuel Kant (1785: 7)3 who argued that a capacity for 
conscious choice set man aside from all animals and formed the basis of 
morality.  Because of his capacity for reason, man was able to make 
choices with an understanding of the likely consequences and could 
therefore be held accountable for his actions. This has become a minimal 
conception of morality, shared by several different ethical theories; 
Rachels (2007: 14) writes that the conscientious moral agent makes the 
effort to seek guidance for his or her actions based upon the best reasons 
for pursuing a particular action in preference to others while giving “equal 
weight to the interests of each individual who will be affected by what one 
does” (Rachels 2007: 14) 
Kant went further in seeking the principle(s) of morality by means of 
which man could discern what he ought to do. Kant held that morality 
could never be a matter of relative truth; instead, he argued that moral 
principles would need to be universally applicable, in the same way that 
the laws of nature were universally applicable (Kant 1785: 52). By his 
account therefore, morality is based upon a priori principle(s) that are 
universally true; man, applying reason to the application of these a priori 
moral principles, can derive maxims from which he can discern what he 
ought to do. Having done so, he can then choose whether or not to abide 
by these maxims. Morality, therefore, is a matter of reasoned choice 
leading to accountability because man is free to make his own decisions; 
                                                            
3
 The translation of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals cited is made by H.J. Patton and 
published by Routledge. In this translation, the pages have been numbered in various ways, including the 
numbering assigned to the second edition of Kant’s work, which was published in his own lifetime. The 
page numbers referenced are those of the second edition. 
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he is self-governing (or autonomous) in respect of the moral choices with 
which he is faced. 
Moral autonomy, as Kant describes it, is presented as unconditional 
freedom. Self-governance in all other respects of human existence is 
necessarily constrained by the social character of our lives and it seems 
paradoxical to claim complete moral freedom. Kant was able to make this 
claim because the moral principles he sought to define were metaphysical 
principles, devoid of all empirical particularity. He suggested that the a 
priori principle of all morality is grounded in the existence of a good will 
leading to actions that are universally applicable. Kant (1785: 52) argued 
that this is the moral law, derived from pure reason; furthermore, the 
dictates of this law are a “categorical imperative” to all rational human 
beings; these laws are “imperative” because they contain injunctions that 
ought to be obeyed and “categorical” because they are derived from the 
unconditional demands of pure reason; in this respect they differ from 
“hypothetical” imperatives, compliance with which will be necessary only 
in pursuit of some conditional outcome. To knowingly act on maxims that 
are inconsistent with the categorical imperative amounts to immorality. 
Moral man is therefore obliged to consider his actions in the light of the 
categorical imperative and is free to choose between maxims that 
endorse or reject this a priori principle (Kant 1785: 88)4. “Autos nomos” 
or self-governance is thus the property of man by means of which he can 
choose those maxims upon which his conduct will be based; it is the law 
he makes for himself, arising from his will. Kant concedes that this 
freedom to choose is only an idea from reason; it is, however, a 
necessary idea as a presupposition for any being who is conscious of a will 
(Kant 1785: 100). 
Kant’s argument that moral agency is an inalienable property of all 
rational men leads to the development of his notion of human dignity 
                                                            
4
 See footnote 3  concerning the reference made to Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 
translated by H.J. Patton 
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(Kant 1785: 86). In his capacity for both reason and moral action 
grounded in autonomous choice, man is unique and therefore, in 
possession of a certain dignity that sets him apart from all other 
creatures; respect for human dignity is the basis upon which limits are set 
concerning the way in which men deal with one another. Kant argues that 
respect for moral agency and autonomy requires us to treat others in 
such a way that they would always be an end in themselves and never 
merely the means to some other end (Kant 1785: 65). From this 
principle, maxims may be derived that establish the necessary limitations 
on how other rational human beings may be treated. By Kantian 
reasoning, similar considerations do not apply to animals. 
In summary, moral autonomy, as an Enlightenment concept, therefore 
concerns how we ought to live, given our awareness of ourselves as moral 
agents imbued with the freedom to choose between right and wrong. 
Moral autonomy is unconditional freedom of choice that sets rational man 
apart from all other animals and which, in itself, commands us to respect 
all other rational beings. 
The exercise of autonomous choice in matters of personal preference may 
have moral content. How we ought to be informs the choices we make in 
different ways but broadly compels us to respect the interests and 
opinions of others. ‘Respect for autonomy’ as a prima facie principle of 
medical ethics is an injunction to respect the dignity of other human 
beings and serves to promote the freedom of others to choose what may 
happen to them. Personal autonomy, unlike moral autonomy, may be 
denied, infringed or violated by our own actions as well as by the acts of 
others. The next section is a conceptual analysis of personal autonomy.  
The concept of personal autonomy 
Self-governance in pursuit of one’s desires and the attainment of 
individual human projects without the interference of others is the 
exercise of agency characterised as ‘personal autonomy’. Self-governance 
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in respect of our personal lives has become a foundational freedom upon 
which the expression of our moral authority rests. This notion has been 
clearly articulated by Isaiah Berlin (1969: 131) when he wrote: 
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of 
whatever kind. I wish to be an instrument of my own, not other men’s, acts 
of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by 
conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes that affect me, as it 
were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer – deciding, 
not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or 
by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave....I wish, above all, 
to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing 
responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my 
own ideas and purposes.  
To be autonomous requires a capacity for rational appreciation as well as 
the ability to put into effect any decisions that may be made. An absence 
of controlling influence is therefore necessary if the freedom to make an 
autonomous choice is to be realized. Both competency and liberty may 
vary with time and circumstance. Consequently, personal autonomy may 
be characterised as an ideal form of autonomy or may be measured by 
degrees in order to determine which decisions are substantially 
autonomous.  
More detailed consideration will be given now to the determination of 
agency and freedom. 
• The issue of competency and agency 
 
Being competent implies an ability to carry out a task successfully. In the 
context of personal autonomy this requires an awareness that a choice 
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may be made; it also requires some process of rational justification in 
favour of a particular option and the intentional selection of a specific 
action. 
a. Awareness 
Awareness is the degree to which we are conscious of the environment in 
which we find ourselves. This will vary during the course of a normal 
human life and is also subject to the effects of disease. In addition, the 
extent to which a person may be aware of circumstances can be limited 
by the knowledge they possess, especially specialized knowledge which 
includes scientific medical knowledge.  
The variation in biological awareness applies to babies, very young 
children as well as those who have any form of intellectual impairment, 
for example: those who suffer from mental retardation, people suffering 
from the consequences of cerebrovascular accidents and those whose 
lives end in a persistent vegetative state. Perceptual impairment is a 
matter of degree, being profound in some and limited in others. 
Consequently, awareness varies along with the capacity for making 
autonomous decisions (Beauchamp and Childress 2001: 58).   
Knowledge about the consequences of the choices confronting an 
individual is also a necessary component of the awareness upon which 
autonomous decisions will be based. In the practice of medicine, the 
benefits and risks of medical treatment are not self-evident to most lay 
people. Hence, disclosure of information by those who provide medical 
care is an essential element in allowing autonomous choice.  
b. Understanding 
Knowing that a choice may be made necessitates deliberation over which 
choice might be best; the rational justification of choice requires reflection 
upon the circumstances at hand while weighing the options available in 
terms of their costs, benefits and consequences. A reasoned decision is 
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one that requires self-examination to determine the acceptability of an 
action to oneself and others. 
Completely unreasoned decisions lead to arbitrary acts that are not an 
expression of the will of the individual and do not represent autonomous 
actions.  
Although reason has primacy in determining which choices are 
autonomous, many decisions are based upon a mixture of reason and 
emotion. Self-governance, in the sense of deciding for oneself, does not 
require actions to be based upon reason alone in order for those actions 
to be authentically those of the agent (Christman 20035); however, 
autonomous actions, brought to judgement, may be more easily justified 
if they are based upon reason than those based upon pure emotion.  
Understanding, in so far as it may reflect rational deliberation, is a 
measure of the competency of the agent called upon to make a decision. 
Hence, children given the opportunity to decide upon medical treatment 
may decline necessary treatment out of fear. Such decisions are not 
competently made or autonomous because they are unreasoned choices 
in which fear supplants any process of weighing the benefits of treatment 
against its costs.  
Understanding, as the capacity to make reasoned decisions, is thus set 
against a continuum that varies from pure rationality through mixed 
rational and emotional responses to predominantly emotional responses 
with completely arbitrary actions set at the other extreme. Full 
understanding may be an ideal infrequently realized but some measure of 
adequate understanding may be necessary if actions are to be judged as 
autonomous. 
    
                                                            
5
 The article cited is a publication in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy; the detailed web address is 
referenced in the bibliography 
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c. Intentional choice 
The exercise of personal autonomy means making an intentional choice 
with awareness of the options and after deliberation about the desirability 
of a particular course of action. Some acts, however, take place without 
any particular thought; these acts are not deemed to be autonomous 
actions. Competent adults may, for example, consent to medical 
intervention without accepting responsibility for making their own 
decisions, choosing instead to rely on the advice of medical professionals. 
Interventions commissioned in this way, do not reflect the intentional 
choice of the patient and cannot be regarded as an expression of the 
autonomous will of the patient. Those who have diminished cognitive 
capacity may fail tests of competency at multiple stages including 
inadequate awareness, inadequate understanding and diminished capacity 
for making an intentional choice.   
• The issue of liberty 
 
Making an intentional choice with awareness and understanding does not 
mean that the choice made was exclusively based upon the free will of 
the individual. To be personally autonomous means making reasoned 
decisions voluntarily and without coercion.  
a. Volition  
Deliberate actions may reflect the will of the individual and nothing else or 
may be grounded in motivations arising only partly from the will of the 
individual. Volition may therefore vary and autonomous acts are most 
clearly defined as acts of self-governance when volition arises solely from 
the will of the individual.  
Knowing what is of us and what is imposed upon us is a judgement not 
easily made. Higher and lower order desires have been invoked as one 
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means of determining volition. Dworkins (1988: 16) suggested that 
higher order desires are used to scrutinize more specific lower order 
desires that are directed towards particular ends. He writes:  
“A person is autonomous if he identifies with his desires, goals, and values, 
and such identification is not influenced in ways which make the process of 
identification in some way alien to the individual”.  
In other words, higher order desires are those with which the individual 
can identify and of which the individual can approve; lower order desires 
need to be consistent with higher order desires if actions arising from 
lower order desires are to be seen as an authentic expression of an 
autonomous will. Being certain that higher order desires are truly our own 
would entail the belief that these desires have not been shaped by 
circumstance.  
b. Controlling influence 
Volition may be conditioned by the influence of others in many ways; 
some find themselves compelled to carry out the wishes of others under 
duress. Such profound interference with the will of another person is 
clearly a violation of their right to self-governance and the individual will 
be aware that they are acting on behalf of others, rather than themselves.  
More pervasive forms of influence are common in modern society; the 
most obvious example is advertising, through which a desire for material 
goods may created. The mass media also conditions the psyche and 
expectations of all who are exposed to it: how we should dress, eat, 
behave towards one another, communicate with one another, what we 
should aspire to possess and what counts for success are all shaped and 
projected through stories and a structured view of life presented by the 
mass media. This view of life is normative; these expectations are 
assimilated into the psyche of modern man to the point where it may no 
longer be clear what volitions arise solely from the will of the individual.  
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Subliminal influence may deny man the capacity to discern his own 
desires separately from those that have been induced in him by the 
influence of others. Hence the desire to possess a pair of designer 
sunglasses or drink some particular branded cool-drink or the tendency to 
believe in a particular religious precept may express the volition of the 
individual subliminally influenced by the social milieu in which he finds 
himself. Acting on such volition may be an act of self-governance, yet not 
an entirely authentic action. Ideally, any infringement of authenticity may 
be regarded as a threat to self-governance and in the extreme, 
psychological compulsion may violate autonomy as profoundly as any 
other form of duress.  
Man, as a social being, cannot escape communal influence and there is no 
clear dividing line between influence that perverts autonomy and that 
which is constitutive of a social existence. Volition is therefore expressed 
on a continuum from pure free will on the one hand to volition completely 
controlled by external forces on the other. In between these extremes is 
volition conditioned by social engagement.  
Autonomy is incompatible with controlling influence and the distinction 
between conditioning influence and controlling influence is the judgement 
necessary to establish whether individual acts are substantially authentic 
and autonomous.  
• Ideal and substantial autonomy 
 
The preceding discussion describes the ideal requirements of autonomous 
action while indicating that ideal standards are seldom attained. 
Conditioning-influence and varying degrees of competence, especially 
limited understanding, allow personal autonomy to be conceptualized as a 
continuum with ideal autonomy set at one extreme. Substantial autonomy 
is a standard that accepts some qualification of ideal autonomy caused by 
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circumstantial influences and variations in agency. These include the 
ability to understand complex concepts, such as the choices that may 
arise between different forms of medical therapy. Agency (reflected in 
awareness, understanding and rational choice) may also be restricted by 
age and illness. Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 71) point out the 
distinction between the legal competency required to sustain individual 
autonomy exercised in the administration of personal affairs and the 
competency necessary to make choices reflecting personal autonomy in 
other aspects of life. The law makes an all-embracing judgement 
regarding competency whereas an individual incompetent in civil 
administration may yet be able to understand and exercise a reasonable 
choice over other aspects of their lives, including decisions about medical 
care. Substantial autonomy may also exist among young people before 
they attain the age of legal consent and the cognitively-impaired may 
retain the ability to decide issues of medical care despite a legal 
declaration of incompetence.  
The threshold level defining substantial competence is arbitrary. Without 
defining what that threshold should be, Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 
73) suggest that the standard should be based upon certain levels of 
incompetence. These may range from an inability to state a preference, 
an inability to understand information or an inability to make a reasoned 
decision.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, to be autonomous means having the freedom to give 
expression to one’s own will through the imposition of actions and choices 
in ways that satisfy one’s own volition. Moral autonomy is unconstrained 
by circumstances other that the rationality and good will of the individual 
whereas personal autonomy is justifiably restricted by our social contract. 
In medical practice, the beneficence of the practitioner has always been 
assumed; the transformational impact of the European Enlightenment 
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stimulated an awareness of individual authority which led directly to the 
notion of self-governance. The authority and beneficence of the doctor 
was no longer the sole determinant of what was right and acceptable; 
instead the will of the individual, empowered by the disclosure of relevant 
information, became the most important moral and legal cornerstone of 
ethical practice in modern medicine.  
The next chapter examines the expression of autonomy in medical 
practice by examining how informed consent gives expression to the self-
governance of individuals. Informed consent is the paradigm example of 
autonomy in contemporary medical practice.  
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Chapter 3 
Informed consent: the paradigm 
example of autonomy in bioethics 
 
In bioethics, respect for patient autonomy has become the central tenet 
of clinical medicine during the last century and is exemplified by the 
practice of seeking informed consent for medical interventions that carry 
both a prospect of therapeutic benefit as well as the risk of potential 
harm. This respect for the right of individuals to make their own decisions 
in matters that concern them directly did not always exist; the first 
articulation of this right is found in the judgement rendered by Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo in the case of Schloendorff v. Society of New York 
Hospital  in 1914. In this case, a surgeon removed a tumour without the 
consent of the patient who had agreed only to an examination under 
ether. Cardozo’s judgment contained the following stipulation:  
“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an 
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault for which he is 
liable in damages. This is true except in cases of emergency where the 
patient is unconscious and where it is necessary to operate before consent 
can be obtained.” 
The need for informed consent was next clearly articulated in the mid-20th 
century as a reaction to the human experimentation that took place in 
Nazi concentration camps (The Nuremberg Code of 19476). Beauchamp 
and Childress (2001: 77) have pointed out that in the last 50 years the 
grounds for seeking consent have shifted: the focus of informed consent 
                                                            
6
 Details in Mitscherlich and Mielke, 1949 
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has moved away from the prevention of harm to the need for showing 
respect for the autonomy of individuals. The protection of autonomy 
rights of research subjects are now enshrined in the Declaration of 
Helsinki published by the World Medical Association.  
The process of seeking informed consent contains elements that draw on 
each and every aspect described in the conceptual analysis of autonomy, 
together with additional contextual aspects. Beauchamp and Childress 
(2001: 80) have described three broad components that are constitutive 
of the consent process; these include threshold elements (issues of 
competency), information elements (disclosure of essential information) 
and consent elements (the process of authorization). Each of these 
elements will now be described in more detail by way of exemplifying the 
principle of autonomy in bioethical practice. 
• Threshold elements 
 
Competency and agency are required of the patient before the process of 
securing informed consent can commence. Discrimination between those 
who are and those who are not competent is important because it 
identifies those from whom informed consent ought to be elicited. 
a. Competency 
Both awareness and understanding are necessary criteria in the 
establishment of competency. In biomedical practice, variations in 
cognitive capacity are common and the preceding discussion about 
impaired agency and the establishment of threshold levels of 
incompetence all apply. Questions about competency also arise, however, 
when cognitively-normal patients make decisions that do not seem to be 
in their own best interest. One of the most frequently cited examples of 
this is that of Jehovah’s witnesses who refuse blood transfusion even at 
the potential cost of their own lives. That patient’s views differ from those 
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of attending clinicians should not, however, be sufficient reason to call 
their judgement and competency into question; medical information must 
be assimilated into the context of an individual’s life because his or her 
material, psychological and social existence nuance disclosed information 
in a way that is unique for each and every individual human being. In this 
way the narrative unity of individual lives is unique and inseparable from 
the capacity for making autonomous choices, even when those choices 
appear to be irrational and hence incompetently made (MacIntyre 1985: 
208). 
b. Understanding 
Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 88) have defined adequate 
understanding as the acquisition of pertinent knowledge leading to 
relevant beliefs. While legal standards of consent focus on aspects of 
disclosure, understanding the implications of a situation or proposed 
therapy is essential to the expression of the autonomous will of the 
individual.  
The promotion of understanding is partly determined by the way in which 
information is sometimes, inadvertently, disclosed; for example, the 
disclosure of risk may be couched in terms that reflect the risk of dying or 
the probability of survival. Choosing to disclose the same risk in different 
terms may bias the understanding of patients in ways that militate 
against the autonomous choice of individual patients. Understanding may 
also be impaired by the use of technical language or the disclosure of an 
overwhelming amount of detailed information. Rational deliberation may 
not be possible under such circumstances. 
Understanding needs to lead to rational beliefs if autonomous decisions 
consistent with informed consent are to be made. The caveat that some 
beliefs are grounded in a unique view of life (the Jehovah’s witness 
example) must be considered before regarding the views of some as 
irrational.      
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c. Voluntariness 
This aspect of informed consent may be seen to encompass the issue of 
both volition and controlling influence. Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 
93) have defined voluntariness as the capacity of the agent to will an 
action without being under the control of another’s influence. They draw a 
distinction between influences and controlling influences; in the former 
category are acts of love and education while the latter group contains 
threats, lies, emotional appeals and direct manipulation. These may be 
further categorized into coercive influences involving threats of harm or 
the use of force that “displaces a person’s self-directedness”; persuasive 
influences arising from reasoned (but not emotional) argument should be 
distinguished from manipulative influences which is the process of 
swaying people into doing what the manipulator wants by means other 
than coercive or persuasive techniques. In medicine, informational 
manipulation is held to be the key form of manipulation and is 
incompatible with autonomous action.  
Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 94) acknowledge the prevalence of 
influence in everyone’s lives and caution against over-calling the influence 
of manipulative intervention, especially when it fails to imperil 
autonomous choice. The need to present reasoned arguments in favour of 
medically essential treatment is necessary and cannot be seen as 
manipulative treatment. They argue that even threatening coercion and 
direct manipulation may be necessary sometimes (e.g. in dealing with an 
unruly patient), although they express greater concern over manipulation 
arising from the promise of rewards. The rewards may take the form of 
free care or financial assistance of various kinds, all of which may be 
irresistible to impoverished subjects. Such people fall under the 
controlling influence of the person making the offer. 
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• Information elements: disclosure and intentional non-disclosure 
 
Awareness and understanding as components of competent decision-
making in the practice of medicine are usually dependent on the 
disclosure of information by medical practitioners. The way in which 
information is disclosed, how much is disclosed together with the 
obligation to ensure that the disclosed information is understood are all 
relevant to the process of informed consent and autonomous decision-
making.  
a. Standards of disclosure 
In biomedical practice, complete understanding of all the circumstances 
pertaining to a particular diagnosis and specific forms of treatment is 
unlikely and usually impossible. Autonomous decision-making is, 
however, dependent upon access to sufficient information, including the 
opinions of the attending physician; Beauchamp and Childress (2001:81) 
suggest that the physician should incorporate information deemed to be 
medically relevant as well as a professional recommendation regarding 
intervention among the other facts disclosed to the patient. 
The amount of information necessary may be judged according to several 
standards. A reasonable doctor standard of disclosure presupposes that 
what ought to be disclosed is best judged by the medical profession itself. 
The reasonable person standard is a hypothetical construct of what a 
reasonable person would wish to know about a given situation. Both these 
standards are impractical with the latter being indefinable while the 
professional standard of disclosure is non-existent as well. A subjective 
standard has also been suggested based upon the individual needs of 
specific patients; this too is poorly defined although, as Beauchamp and 
Childress (2001: 83) point out, is morally defensible because it gives 
recognition to the unique requirements of the individual. 
42 
 
Disclosure is therefore required, albeit the extent of that disclosure 
remains undefined. On occasions, however, physicians have deemed it 
necessary to withhold information from patients in their own best 
interests. This is an example of paternalistic behaviour. 
b. Non-disclosure and medical research 
The extent to which paternalistic behaviour may be justified in the 
provision of health care will be addressed in the subsequent chapter. Non-
disclosure of information may be touted as necessary if such information, 
given to the patient, results in anxiety or irrational decisions. Such 
interference in the process of autonomous decision-making has been 
condemned by the American judiciary and is morally indefensible because 
it unjustifiably denies the dignity and agency of the individual. 
Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 84) conclude that non-disclosure would 
only be morally defensible if the information provided was likely to render 
the patient incompetent.    
Other examples of non-disclosure may be seen in the therapeutic use of 
placebo drugs and in the pursuit of research studies. In the case of 
placebo drugs, manipulation of the patient’s understanding about how 
they are being treated is implicit to the use of such “therapeutic” agents. 
Justification for the use of placebo can only be sought in an appeal to 
paternalistic beneficence. This is, however, unlikely to justify the denial of 
patient’s autonomy rights. 
Non-disclosure in pursuit of medical research also cannot be morally 
defended where manipulation is pursued by the researchers. Beauchamp 
and Childress (2001: 88) argue an exception to this rule in the case of 
behavioural and physiological psychology research providing that 
participants in research programmes have knowledge of and agree to 
deception as part of the study. 
Non-disclosure is thus morally largely indefensible. 
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• Consent elements 
 
Giving consent requires the exercise of agency. The expression of agency 
may be mediated by the patient himself or by means of deferred or 
delegated authority. The manner in which consent is granted by way of 
expressing a preference for a particular option is defined both by the law 
as well as by the moral considerations arising from the preceding 
discussion concerning the exercise of autonomous choice. 
a. Authorization and legal standards 
The legal stipulations concerning informed consent incorporate tests of 
competency, elements of disclosure and finally witnessed documentation 
of assent. The law addresses competency in the context of age with 
children requiring the assent of a guardian; in other respects, those with 
cognitive impairment who are deemed incompetent in civil administration 
are seen as globally incompetent in the eyes of the law and need to rely 
on surrogate decision-makers. 
Standards of disclosure have evolved by means of a series of court rulings 
and case law that established firstly the professional standard which has 
been supplanted by the reasonable person standard. As a result of these 
rulings, guidelines have been constructed suggesting that essential 
elements of disclosure should include information about the nature of a 
proposed procedure, the alternatives to the proposal as well as the risks 
and benefits of the procedure. 
Assent is usually granted in writing although verbal agreement suffices for 
some interventions such as blood transfusion. In this process, the law 
places greater emphasis on issues of disclosure and the formalities of 
witnessed consent than on understanding and voluntariness, each of 
which are morally important to the process of informed consent. That 
which satisfies legal requirements may not amount to informed consent.  
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b. Authorization and moral requirements 
The moral requirements of informed consent with respect to competency, 
understanding and volition following adequate disclosure end with the 
assent or refusal of treatment by the patient. The moral standard of 
consent differs from the legal standard by placing greater emphasis on 
understanding and voluntariness; it also allows greater freedom in the 
assessment of competency including the competency of minor children, 
whose capacity for autonomy may go unrecognised by the law. 
c. Deferred and delegated autonomy 
“Delegated” autonomy is invoked when choices must be made on behalf 
of someone who is incompetent. Delegated autonomy may be exercised 
by a surrogate decision-maker or may be dependent on an advance 
directive issued by the person concerned while they were still competent. 
Surrogate decision makers may be a family member, a physician, a 
hospital administration or a court of law. Whoever is called upon to 
exercise surrogate authority may do so by invoking different criteria. 
Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 99) describe three standards of 
decision-making that surrogates may apply: the patient’s best interest, 
pure autonomy and substituted judgement. They describe the substituted 
judgment standard as one that requires the surrogate to “don the mental 
mantle of the incompetent” in order to arrive at a decision; to do this, it 
presupposes a deep understanding between the surrogate and the subject 
and also assumes that the subject was once competent. The pure 
autonomy standard is based upon the previously expressed opinions of 
the once competent will of the subject; this amounts to an informal type 
of advance directive, which may lead to dispute among care-givers. The 
best-interest standard requires the surrogate to determine the option with 
the highest net benefit by assigning weightings to the interests the 
patient was known to have in each option; this amounts to a quality-of-
life evaluation. Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 103) express the opinion 
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that the process of surrogate decision making is now preferentially 
addressed through autonomously executed advance directives or by 
means of substituted judgement with the best-interest standard reserved 
for situations where neither of the two preceding options can be 
exercised. In reaching this conclusion they have prioritised in descending 
order those decision-making exercises that are most likely to give 
expression to the previously autonomous will of the individual. 
Conclusion 
Informed consent is the expression of individual choice. Its pre-eminence 
in all of medical practice is a very visible rejection of paternalism based 
upon the beneficence of the medical practitioner. What the individual wills 
for him or herself is held to be that to which the individual is entitled. Yet 
the sovereignty of the individual is limited not only by the limitations of 
his or her own agency but also by the claims of others in his or her 
community. Autonomy is restricted in order to sustain the justifiable 
interests of others. The next chapter considers the ways in which personal 
autonomy may be limited.  
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Chapter 4 
The scope of autonomy 
 
I have argued that self-awareness as an Enlightenment ideal fostered our 
sense of self-governance. The idea that rational man has unrestricted 
freedom to choose between right and wrong is the basis of his moral 
autonomy and cannot be infringed by others. Furthermore, as Berlin has 
argued, self-governance in respect of our personal lives is a foundational 
freedom upon which the expression of our moral authority rests.  
However, there are many ways in which our personal autonomy may be 
restricted. Most obviously we may deprive others of their right to 
autonomous decision-making by directly interfering in their lives or by 
manipulating their desires; this may be an exercise conducted in pursuit 
of our own self-interest, for which there is generally no moral defence; it 
may be, however, that we judge our interventions to be in the best 
interests of others: either in the sense of promoting their welfare or 
preventing them from coming to harm. In the latter circumstance, the 
exercise of beneficence and non-maleficence may overrule personal 
autonomy although it would require justification before being considered 
morally acceptable; Hence, our social lives compel us to consider whether 
the exercise of our personal sovereignty may not adversely affect the 
legitimate interests of others within our community, for in pursuing our 
interests, we are also morally obliged to respect the will of others in the 
same way as we ourselves wish to be respected.   
Furthermore, the benefits of a shared social existence need to be 
distributed fairly within a community, even if doing so frustrates the 
autonomously-formed aspirations of some individuals.  
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Finally, we also need to consider the primacy of our interests when set 
against the interests of the community as a whole.  
I will consider each of these restrictions to the scope of personal 
autonomy in more detail with specific reference to biomedical aspects. 
Refraining from harming others 
 
In exercising our right to autonomous action we are clearly free to pursue 
our own interests and beliefs only in so far as the consequences of our 
acts may have an effect on ourselves and no-one else. When the 
expression of our agency has an influence on others, the possibility of 
either fostering or harming their interests exists. Whether we can justify 
either of these effects as a consequence of expressing our own autonomy 
requires deliberation.   
a. The practice of avoiding harm: non-maleficence 
To harm someone implies that their interests have been violated. In 
general, this may encompass the infliction of physical or psychological 
pain, physical harm, psychological duress, loss of liberty, loss of privacy, 
loss of reputation, loss of property or loss of life.  
In bioethics, the major forms of harm are those of death, disability and 
pain. These setbacks to the interests of the individual concerned are at 
first glance harmful and a prima facie obligation to prevent the imposition 
of this harm would be seemingly justified.  
This argument, however, cannot be sustained where the autonomously-
expressed free will of the individual embraces a life-style that gives rise to 
the risk of injury and illness; an example is that of cigarette-smoking, 
now clearly linked to chronic lung disease as well as a heightened risk of 
both premature pulmonary and cardiovascular mortality. May a physician 
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(or the state) intervene in the lives of others in order to prevent harm and 
promote the interests of the individual against their wishes?  
The answer to this question is especially pertinent to bioethics because 
there is an asymmetrical power relationship between physicians and their 
patients as well as a presumption that power will be exercised 
beneficently (implying that beneficence is its own justification). In 
practice, the licence to intervene in the lives of others based upon 
beneficence has sometimes been seen to lead to the harmful imposition of 
risk and injury. 
Two separate questions are thus presented: is it permissible to overrule 
the autonomy of individuals in order to prevent them from coming to 
harm and secondly, is it permissible to pursue the welfare of others 
against their wishes, especially where this may also result in some degree 
of harm. The answer to both these questions must take account of the 
primacy of personal autonomy.  
Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 115) have considered the possibility of 
harm accruing to the interests of individuals in specific circumstances 
where the intentions and acts of the physician are potentially set against 
the interests of the patient. The first example they cite is that of 
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from critically-ill 
patients. On the surface of things, allowing someone to die without 
treatment would not seem to be in the interests of the person concerned. 
Providing or withholding treatment ordinarily requires informed consent, 
either of the person concerned or, in the case of an incompetent patient, 
the consent of surrogates to whom such responsibility had been 
delegated. However, physicians may decide that treatment of a dying 
person is futile in the face of a poor prognosis and commonly decide to 
withhold life-sustaining interventions. In doing so, neither withholding nor 
withdrawing treatment would be held blameworthy and of the two, 
withdrawing treatment may be more defendable simply because it is 
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usually associated with greater certainty concerning the diagnosis and 
prognosis of the underlying condition. This opinion (to withhold life-
sustaining treatment) may be held against the wishes of the individual or 
their family articulated by means of advance directives or the opinions of 
surrogates. Overruling these views by withholding treatment, where 
ongoing treatment had been requested, would need to be justified - and 
often is - on the basis of scarce resources and an appeal to justice in the 
distribution of goods available for the provision of medical care in the 
community as a whole. But, aside from this justification, the autonomous 
wishes of the patient or his or her surrogates would need to be respected 
and even futile treatment may not be withheld without informed consent.   
Given that the justification for withholding care against the 
autonomously-expressed wishes of the patient is legitimately made only 
on the grounds that there are inadequate resources to provide care, the 
question arises whether less resource-intensive interventions are justified 
even if more heroic and expensive measures are not. Beauchamp and 
Childress (2001: 126) are of the opinion that withholding routine care, 
including artificial nutrition, is no different to withholding extraordinary 
care. They argue that such distinctions are morally irrelevant, stating that 
where treatment is futile, any consideration about the type of treatment 
provided or withheld should be based solely upon whether the treatment 
is likely to be burdensome or beneficial, using quality of life criteria.  
This argument is not persuasive given that the legitimate grounds for 
withholding care are solely based upon resource distribution. Hence the 
provision of simple routine care including artificial nutrition would be 
justified, if requested.  
Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 136) go on to extend their line of 
discussion about optional or obligatory treatment based upon quality-of-
life criteria. Treatment, they argue, is optional if the burdens outweigh the 
benefits of intervention. Not only the terminally ill, but anyone seeking 
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medical care may choose to reject treatment regarded as burdensome. 
Neonatal care, for example, may have the capacity to secure survival of 
very small newly-born children, but does so with the attendant risk of 
severe morbidity, especially neurological damage. Treatment may be 
justifiably withheld in these circumstances, based upon the avoidance of 
harm; nevertheless, value judgements about quality of life necessitate 
informed consent by the patient or surrogates. 
The decision to withhold or withdraw treatment must thus be based upon 
the wishes of the patient and may be limited by those value-judgements 
of physicians to which the patient assents; the autonomous wishes of the 
patient may also be legitimately limited by the availability of resources, 
which will be discussed further when considering issues of justice.     
The issue of inadvertent but unavoidable harm is no less constrained by 
the need for informed consent. Some interventions have double effects 
that are simultaneously beneficial and harmful. The classical example of 
such an intervention may be the preterm delivery of a child in order to 
save the life of a pregnant woman. Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 129) 
describe criteria that would justify this type of harm; these criteria include 
a preponderance of good over bad effects, that the good effect isn’t 
realized by virtue of inducing harm and that the intentions of the 
physician should be good. However, none of these criteria supplant or 
supersede the need for informed consent: to risk harming the child in 
order to save the life of a pregnant woman still requires the consent of 
the mother who is also the surrogate decision-maker acting on behalf of 
her child. Justification of the harm that accrues on the basis of 
beneficence towards the pregnant woman does not vitiate the need for 
consent nor does it deny the need to respect the autonomy of those 
concerned or the surrogate expression of autonomy by those who may act 
on their behalf. 
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The primacy of autonomy is further reflected in considerations pertaining 
to physician-assisted suicide. The definition of killing offered by 
Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 140) is the death of a human being, 
brought about intentionally by the actions of another; such actions include 
acts of commission and omission. In terms of this definition, there is no 
moral distinction between killing and allowing to die. An intentionally-
arranged death in the form of physician-assisted suicide is one such 
example of killing7. Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 144) reflect on the 
anomalous position in most societies where medical practitioners are 
required morally and legally to respect the autonomously-expressed 
desire of a patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment, while the 
autonomously-expressed will of the patient to end their own life enjoys 
neither legal nor moral respect. They hold that the request of a 
competent person freely requesting to die, based upon net personal 
benefit, should not be seen as a setback to his or her interests and to act 
in respect of such wishes involves no moral harm. Failing to act on such 
wishes may indeed lead to harm by denying the autonomy of the 
individual and possibly prolonging existence that is of no value to the 
person concerned. This anomalous position is defended by social concern 
about the possibility of slippery-slope escalation that may see the 
premature deaths of individuals being organized and justified for 
increasingly less acceptable reasons; the need to hold those engaged in 
physician-assisted suicide accountable would weigh heavily in the social 
acceptance of such measures and in most countries the autonomy of 
individuals is denied in favour of socially-determined policies that prohibit 
physician-assisted suicide despite moral justification. However, 
communitarian perspectives have their own moral standing and this 
infringement of individual autonomy may be justified by these 
considerations which will be discussed later. 
                                                            
7
 Rachels (2003: 91) describes the case of Mathew Donnelly who was killed by his sibling in order to 
alleviate the severe and unremitting pain he was destined to endure for the last year of his life. Rachels 
outlines the moral argument justifying this type of mercy killing, referring to utilitarian theory. 
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In conclusion: the prevention of harm which others choose to inflict on 
themselves remains a matter of ensuring that such harm is intentional 
and rational in the way that informed consent would be sought for any 
other potentially beneficial or harmful intervention; once an autonomous 
decision is made, there are no moral grounds for infringing the autonomy 
of the individual other than social concerns, such as those alluded to in 
respect of physician-assisted suicide.  
Inflicting harm on others during the provision of medical care, either 
deliberately or inadvertently is morally justified in some circumstances 
but always requires the consent of the patient or surrogates acting on 
their behalf. Where that consent is withheld, harm may be inflicted 
justifiably (and with traces of moral regret), only as a matter of justice 
where equitable distribution of social goods precludes specific 
interventions.             
Autonomy of the individual is thus preserved and respected in all 
circumstances save those superseded by the needs of distributive justice 
or communitarian-based morality.  
b. The practice of promoting the interests of others: beneficence 
Beneficence is the positive promotion of the welfare of others. Non-
maleficence is viewed as refraining from harming others whereas deeds 
that prevent and remove harm may be seen as good acts performed in 
favour of other people and are commonly grouped with other positive acts 
as examples of beneficence. Medicine, since antiquity, has been viewed as 
a beneficent profession and the presumption of beneficence persists as 
the dominant prima facie principle of medical care. Beneficence is also the 
underpinning philosophy of utilitarian theory that seeks the greatest 
balance of welfare or happiness among people as the single principle from 
which right or wrong may be adduced.  
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Adherence to the principle of beneficence may supersede the preferences 
of individuals; this is often justifiably the case where parents intervene in 
the lives of their children. To intentionally override a person’s known 
preferences or actions with the goal of benefitting or avoiding harm to the 
person whose preferences or actions are overridden is both beneficent 
and an example of strong paternalism. To apply paternalistic, beneficent 
intervention in the life of an autonomous adult would violate that person’s 
autonomy. Neither individuals nor state institutions can morally justify 
such infringements of autonomy; John Stuart Mill (1859 / 2006: 16) 
argued that the happiness of individuals depended substantially on their 
freedom from external authority8. He claimed that the entire extent of 
legitimate authority exercised by the state was confined to preventing 
individuals from harming one another and that the state had no licence to 
intervene in the lives of individuals in a paternalistic way. In ‘On Liberty’ 
he famously rejected any interference in the lives of individuals, even in 
the form of institutionalised beneficence when he wrote: 
‘The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others’. (Mill 1859 / 2006: 16) 
Paternalism is, however, encountered in medical practice, being seen in 
the provision of public health measures as well as in the management of 
individual patients. In public health, many instances of protection that 
seem paternalistic (such as vaccination policies) may be justified on non-
paternalistic grounds, specifically, the protection of third parties; here, 
communitarian values rather than beneficence trump individual 
autonomy. In the case of individual patients, paternalistic intervention is 
commonly seen in cases of attempted suicide. Social institutions such as 
the police, emergency services, religious organizations and citizens in 
general all seek to intervene in the prevention of suicide. Although 
                                                            
8
 The compilation of works by John Stuart Mill cited is the Penguin Classics publication edited by Alan 
Ryan. 
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decriminalized it provides grounds for involuntary hospitalization in many 
countries, including South Africa. Yet the prevention of attempted suicide 
may frustrate the autonomous will of the individual. In their analysis of 
suicide, Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 189) refer to John Stuart Mill 
and conclude that based upon autonomy-rights, John Stuart Mill has not 
endorsed intervention, being prepared only to concede that a strategy of 
temporary intervention be found acceptable as a way of ensuring that the 
individual decision made was informed and truly autonomous. Despite the 
moral grounds for allowing suicide, the law continues to support 
involuntary hospitalization. This anomalous situation is rooted in 
communitarian adherence to symbolic acts that express concern for the 
welfare of individuals and the belief that most who attempt suicide are 
indeed, mentally ill. In this respect, as it has been the case throughout 
this discussion, autonomy is overruled not by beneficence itself but by 
communitarian perspectives. 
Sharing social goods: the issue of justice 
 
In the preceding discussion, autonomy has been overruled justifiably by 
the interests of others; in following our own desires we may suffer 
setbacks to our interests when the goods needed to execute our life-plans 
are denied because of opposing claims. In medicine, resource distribution 
has become of critical importance as the cost of technology escalates to 
the point where all the care that is available cannot be given to everyone 
who might benefit from it. Furthermore, access to medical care is 
increasingly regarded as a human right serviced by individual 
governments whose remit it is to provide the essential needs of the 
community. This dichotomy between the right to health care and limited 
resources is resolved broadly by the notion that the right of access to 
health care should be limited to a bare-minimum standard of care for all 
and that care over and beyond this limit should be available to those who 
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can afford it. Within this framework, a fair distribution of what is available 
must be elaborated because the autonomous wishes of some individuals 
will necessarily be denied by such a system. 
a. Creating a fair distribution: theories of justice   
Different views of justice have been derived from different moral theories; 
each of these theories of justice has implications for individual members 
of the society trying to secure their own welfare. 
Utilitarian theory is usually invoked in the design of public health policy. 
Utilitarians adhere to one principle only: that of maximized welfare. In 
pursuit of this goal, no other considerations are pertinent and individual 
rights provide no obstacle to the exercise of distributive justice which is 
seen as a policy leading to maximum overall utility. In the context of this 
theory the autonomous will of the individual is revoked without any moral 
remorse should the overall calculus of interest find it necessary to do so.   
Libertarians see justice achieved through the conservation of property and 
liberty rights. Just procedures are more important than the actual 
distribution of social goods (including health) and the pursuit of health is 
a matter of individual initiative conducted under fair circumstances. 
Libertarians make no appeal to fairness in the distribution of social goods 
and the autonomous will of the individual seeking social goods may be 
denied on the basis that health care is a matter of personal endeavor 
rather than a responsibility of government.   
Egalitarians believe that everyone in a society should have an equal share 
of certain goods, including health care. John Rawls’ theory of justice 
incorporates a ‘fair opportunity’ rule stating that no person should receive 
social benefits on the basis of undeserved advantageous properties and 
no person should be denied social benefits on the basis of undeserved 
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disadvantageous properties (Beauchamp 1991: 3679). The application of 
this rule to existing biological and social inequities justifies the distribution 
of any inequalities that do exist in favor of those who are least benefitted. 
In medical care, the fair opportunity principle has been invoked by 
Norman Daniels (2004: 75) as follows:   
“Since maintaining normal functioning makes a limited but significant 
contribution to protecting the range of opportunities open to individuals, it 
is plausible to see the principle guaranteeing fair equality of opportunity as 
the appropriate principle to govern the distribution of health care, broadly 
construed to include primary and secondary preventive health as well as 
medical services.”  
Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 234) also refer to fair opportunity in 
their discussion concerning the principle of justice:   
“…social institutions affecting health care distribution should be arranged to 
allow each person to achieve a fair share of the normal range of 
opportunities in that society”   
This implies that those suffering from disease or disability do not enjoy 
equal and fair opportunity in the pursuit of social goods; health care (inter 
alia) becomes a right sustained in the interest of building a fair and just 
distribution of social goods by allowing all members of a society fair 
opportunity of participation. This theory of justice protects the capacity of 
all members of a society to pursue and exercise their autonomous desire 
for medical care. It takes account of the burdens and benefits attributable 
to natural social and biological inequities (the lotteries of life) and seeks 
redress for those inequities in a way that is fair. While this theory also 
recognizes health care as a right, it does not deny the possibility that 
                                                            
9
 Rawls’ book A Theory of Justice was published by Harvard University Press in 1971. The citation provided 
here refers to extracts from this text, reprinted in Beauchamp’s book Philosophical Ethics published in 
1991.    
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limited resources can frustrate the will of the individual although the 
burden of dealing with such economic limitations in the provision of health 
care is seen to be fairly distributed. 
Even if health care is recognized as a right and egalitarian precepts are 
used as the basis upon which health care is structured, the manner in 
which scarce resources are to be distributed remains at issue. 
b. Distributing scarce resources: rationing 
Macroeconomic decisions are made by governments in respect of social 
service delivery. These political decisions determine the extent of the 
funding available for the provision of health care. The way in which this 
budget is distributed is also a political decision that may project an 
emphasis on preventative or curative services. Regardless of how these 
macroeconomic decisions are made, insufficient resources will be 
available to service all the possibilities of modern technological medicine 
and some individuals will be denied access to treatment, including life-
sustaining treatment. Rationing what is available may be achieved by 
restricting expensive treatment programs, by establishing attainable bare 
minimum standards of care and by choosing to restrict the availability of 
care to certain segments of the population, such as the aged. 
Expensive programs such as transplantation services may not be 
affordable and such interventions may be legitimately rationed by 
societies who make such decisions democratically, even if they are viewed 
as being discriminatory. Establishing a bare minimum of care may be 
difficult: Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 257) have documented the 
difficulties encountered by the state of Oregon when the implementing 
this approach. The use of cost-effectiveness and quality-adjusted life-
years as indices against which different interventions could be ranked in 
order of priority resulted in discrimination against the young and elderly 
as well as arbitrary nonsensical rankings. Rationing on the basis of age is 
discriminatory but more defensibly so than discrimination based on 
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gender or race; the most powerful argument made in favor of such 
rationing is that of prudential rationalization of health costs; by this 
account, the amount of money spent on any single individual is deemed 
to be the same and most would choose to endorse the expenditure of this 
income to secure a normal lifespan ahead of expenditure designed to 
guarantee an extended lifespan. By this reasoning, the available health 
expenditure should be biased in favor of providing services to the young. 
Notwithstanding this type of reasoning and other views supporting 
discrimination based upon the “fair innings” concept, Beauchamp and 
Childress (2001: 262) reject the notion of age-discrimination and hold 
that age-based decisions would be viewed as unjust in many countries. 
Rationing available care is therefore unavoidable and no clearly accepted 
way of doing so exists at present. What is clear is that available resources 
should be used most beneficially and only treatments known to be 
effective should be utilized; that whatever rationing takes place should be 
socially-endorsed and that morally, it is problematic to discriminate 
between individuals (such as the aged) based upon the social worth of 
their lives. Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 268) conclude that queuing, 
using a lottery or randomization may be the only fair ways of allocating 
scarce resources with the first-mentioned being the most acceptable. 
In conclusion, the demands of justice are that each person be treated 
fairly, including having access to health care. The way in which the wealth 
of society is disbursed will determine its capacity for health care and 
individuals may find themselves denied access to care because of social 
conventions. Although the processes by which such decisions are reached 
are varied (and subject to their own justification), the fact of rationing is 
inescapable.  
Rationing constitutes a broadly-justified limitation to the interests and 
autonomously-exercised free will of the individual. 
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Individual interests versus community values: communitarianism 
 
The freedom to be oneself and the awareness of being oneself is the 
product of Enlightenment philosophy fostered in rejection of all externally-
imposed forms of authority, especially the church and autocratic political 
systems. To be autonomous became more important than being part of a 
socially-coherent community to whose beliefs and expectations one could 
be bound. This commitment to the sovereignty of the individual has been 
confronted with insistent social realities that give rise to questions about 
the limits to which any individual may pursue their own self-interest 
ahead of the community in which they live; these social realities are those 
of environmental degradation associated with global warming, the 
population explosion that threatens the sustainability of resources and 
increasingly vast disparities in both wealth and power within communities. 
The individual is confronted by his or her dependence on the society in 
which he or she lives and is forced to consider his or her obligation to 
sustain that society, if for no other reason than to secure their own 
survival. This curtailment of the interests of the individual in favor of what 
might be best for society as a whole is a paradigm shift away from the 
supremacy of the autonomous being. Communitarian philosophy 
emphasizes the social roles, traditions and virtues necessary to play a role 
in the life of a community. The importance of man co-existing with man is 
further elucidated by theories of relational ethics and in the South African 
context the concept of Ubuntu articulates our inter-relatedness and 
responsibility for one another. Each of these philosophies presents a 
challenge to the autonomy of the individual and will be described 
individually. 
a. Communitarian philosophy 
Communitarianism has been articulated by several philosophers including 
Charles Taylor, Daniel Callahan and Alasdair MacIntyre. MacIntyre (1985: 
121) draws on the structure of ancient Greek society to illustrate a view 
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of man in which he is a member of a community rather than an individual 
within that society. In ancient Greece, men lived in city-states (the polis) 
that assigned to each individual a clearly defined social role. Within these 
roles the issue of the good of man became a judgement measured against 
his or her success in attaining a designated social destiny. Virtues were 
required and actively taught in order to be successful in a particular role. 
The concept of the dignity of individual men did not exist among the 
ancient Greeks and the exercise of moral judgement became a question 
of virtuous conduct within designated social roles (together with 
adherence to the laws of the polis). Man was not required to choose that 
which was right: instead, what was required of him was defined by his 
social role and the only possibility he could exercise was that of failing to 
do the right thing by not fulfilling his designated social role. Within these 
communities, the concept of individual human rights did not exist and 
practices now unacceptable in any modern liberal-individualist philosophy 
were tolerated without question: in particular, the subjugation of slaves 
and women. Aristotle also held the view that the exercise of moral 
judgement required intelligence, education and a political structure within 
which to exercise social skills; those who lacked these attributes were 
excluded from participation in the moral community of the polis through 
no fault of their own (MacIntyre 1985: 158).    
Despite these shortcomings evident in pre-modern society and faced with 
the consequences of modernity, several philosophers have advocated a 
return to communitarian ideals. MacIntyre (1985: 259), among others, 
has rejected the tenets of liberal individualism; his views draw a sharp 
distinction between the ‘self’ of modernity (radically free individuals who 
are answerable to themselves before all else) and the pre-modern ‘self’ 
who lacked self-consciousness and whose measure of the good life was 
bound to the social role he occupied and through which he reached his 
telos - a conception of man allowing little room for individual autonomy 
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with the interests of the community exercising precedence over individual 
aspirations (MacIntyre 1985: 259).  
Daniel Callahan (2003: 289) has also targeted the role that autonomy 
plays in liberal societies arguing that being free to choose is not enough. 
He reasons that autonomy:  
“....as a moral principle ought to encompass not simply our right to make 
our own choices whenever possible, but also lead us to take seriously the 
ethical implications of the different choices open to us, whether in our public 
or private lives. Serious ethics, the kind that causes trouble to comfortable 
lives, wants to know what counts as a good choice and what counts as a 
bad choice.” 
Callahan (2003: 288) sees autonomy playing a dominant role in modern 
ethical reasoning, especially in the principlist approach endorsed by 
Beauchamp and Childress. He observes that this approach is inherently 
individualistic and emphasizes autonomy; he observes that even the other 
principles that may conflict with one another are themselves to some 
extent derivative aspects of autonomy and where conflict occurs, the 
important conflict is always a contest between autonomy and one of the 
other principles. Non-maleficence he believes may be seen as a historical 
variant of autonomy; beneficence is eschewed by modern liberals because 
it requires some conception of what may be good for someone else, thus 
impeding their right to autonomy. Callahan (2003: 288) observes that  
“...only religious believers are willing to take beneficence seriously”.  
Even justice, he suggests, involves allocating resources in an equitable 
manner so that others can function as autonomous persons (Callahan 
2003: 288). Callahan’s views suggest that there is little real moral 
opposition to the dominance of autonomy within principlist discourse with 
the communitarian challenge bringing a new perspective on autonomy 
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and doing the right thing; specifically, benefitting the community becomes 
a responsibility that challenges the individual’s right to do as he will. 
Being self-aware is no longer enough; an awareness of the needs of 
others is required and the sensitivity to  
“....understand the embedded quality of our lives....to take the measure of 
the culture of which we are a part” (Callahan 2003: 288)  
The application of communitarian thought to the practice of medicine 
would place limitations on the autonomy of the individual both in the field 
of public medicine and in the care of individual patients. In public 
medicine, the aspects of justice used to secure a fair distribution of 
medical resources would be defended on the basis of fostering the life of 
the community. Rationing care would more easily accept restrictions on 
the care provided to the aged by acknowledging the narrative unity of 
individual lives; lives that are seen to have been lived in fulfilment of a 
given telos. Callahan (1990, cited in Beauchamp and Childress 2001: 
261) has argued that while medical care should be provided to all, society 
should help the elderly by relieving their suffering rather than by seeking 
to extend their lives; this would be justifiable simply because once life’s 
possibilities have been “on the whole achieved”, death becomes a 
relatively acceptable event . This view resonates broadly with that of 
other communitarians: MacIntyre (1985:218) also deduces that 
judgements made about individuals need to incorporate some measure of 
the narrative unity inherent in their lives. 
In the medical care of individual patients, the practices of antiquity were 
founded on beneficence and paternalism; in modernity, beneficence came 
to be seen as paternalistic, yet paradoxically, it retains some acceptance 
(although always set against individual autonomy). The autonomous 
agent now seeks control over his or her own care and in doing so, has 
changed the role of the physician. Some have suggested that the role of 
the physician is radically reduced to “..that of mere ancillary or servant to 
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the patient” (Charlesworth 1996: 6). Daniel Callahan (1988: 60) has 
added his perspective, saying the following: 
“If we want to have good doctor-patient relationships, we can’t reduce that 
relationship exclusively to the language of rights, particularly the language 
of patient rights. A consequence is to jeopardise the doctor’s important role 
as a moral agent. At one extreme the doctor is turned into nothing but a 
plumber. The challenge is to recognise that when doctors and patients enter 
into a relationship they begin to create a community, or at least a profound 
relationship which the language of rights does not adequately describe. In 
one sense each has to help the other. The doctor has to educate the patient, 
help the patient understand what might serve his or her welfare. And the 
patient has to find a way to tell the physician what he or she is trying to live 
for. It ought to be a richer language than is captured in the language of 
autonomy and rights.”   
Paradoxically, this rejection of radical patient autonomy also serves to 
underline autonomy as a central feature of the doctor-patient relationship 
by delineating the autonomy of both the patient and the physician. 
In conclusion, communitarian philosophy restricts the scope of personal 
autonomy by making beneficent contributions to society a prerequisite for 
moral agency. In medicine, the focus shifts from respecting the wishes of 
the patient to determining which needs of individuals may be 
accommodated by society as well as what demands society may make of 
individuals. 
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b. Relational ethics and Ubuntu 
Not only does a sense of community call us to account for decisions we 
make but our relations with other individuals do so too. The idea that 
human beings have intrinsic worth governing the way they may be 
deliberately treated by others is the familiar essence of all moral 
argument. Emmanual Levinas has observed that we are called to moral 
accountability by our inter-relatedness with one another (Bergo 200810). 
He argues that inter-relatedness is inescapably part of us; we are drawn 
to social interaction by the presence of others in a precognitive and 
affective way. Because of this, we are faced with recognising the primacy 
of human relations; this is a different conception of man to the self-aware 
and self-governing man who emerged from modernity. Levinas suggests 
we need to recognise the importance of being inter-related and to accept 
responsibility for our own actions and the respect we owe to others, 
regardless of whether the other reciprocates. This accountability to others 
is nurtured from early in our lives by our developmental dependence on 
parents and care-givers; being self-governing and accountable to others 
imposes limits on our autonomy which is shaped through social 
engagement.   
The concept of relational ethics provides little specific substance to the 
limitations of personal autonomy but, like communitarian philosophy, it 
claims general restrictions to the autonomous freedom of the individual. It 
also resonates with the African concept of Ubuntu because the 
communitarian view of man is not uniquely a product of the Western 
intellectual tradition.  
In South Africa, the concept of Ubuntu is used to define man in his social 
context. Ubuntu is a Zulu word with spiritual meaning, further exemplified 
                                                            
10
 The account of Levinas’ philosophy is based upon the description of his work published by Bergo in the 
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy and is available at the web address detailed in the bibliography. 
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by the Zulu maxim of umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (Louw 199811). 
Translated, this means “a person is a person through other persons”. The 
South African Governmental White Paper on Welfare (also cited in Louw, 
1998) defines Ubuntu as  
“The principle of caring for each other’s wellbeing...and a spirit of mutual 
support...Each individual’s humanity is ideally expressed through his or her 
relationship with others and theirs in turn through a recognition of the 
individual’s humanity. Ubuntu means that people are people through other 
people. It also acknowledges both the rights and responsibilities of every 
citizen in promoting individual and societal wellbeing” 
Louw (1998) has pointed out that the way in which Ubuntu respects the 
particularity of others says something of the way in which it views 
individuality. Individuality in the modern Western idiom is Cartesian in its 
conception of individual existence set against the rest of the community 
and society; in African culture, the individual can only define himself by 
virtue of his relationships with others. As Louw (1998) puts it:  
“Thus understood, the word ‘individual’ signifies a plurality of personalities 
corresponding to the multiplicity of relationships in which the individual in 
question stands. Being an individual by definition means ‘being-with-others’. 
‘With-others’...is not added on to a pre-existent and self-sufficient being; 
rather, both this being (the self) and the others find themselves in a whole 
wherein they are already related’. This is all somewhat boggling for the 
Cartesian mind, whose conception of individuality now has to move from 
solitary to solidarity, from independence to interdependence, from 
individuality vis-a-vis community to individuality a la community.” 
                                                            
11
 The paper cited was presented at the 20
th
 World Congress of Philosophy in Boston. The proceedings, 
including this text are available in the Paideia archive, the web address of which is included in the 
bibliography.   
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This notion of solidarity with a community of people places restrictions on 
individual autonomy. In so far as Ubuntu is a philosophy of respect and 
compassion for others, it has a curious parallel with Western history 
because it also lends itself to oppressive political collectivism based upon 
solidarity; the desire for consensus inherent in Ubuntu “..can easily derail 
into an oppressive collectivism or communalism” (Louw 1998). The 
parallel with political oppression in pre-modern Western society is 
evident, albeit that the oppression of Western society took place in spite 
of a communitarian spirit and not because of it. Freedom of the individual 
in every respect is a construct of the European Enlightenment. Speaking 
of traditional African society, Sono (1994: xiii, xv cited in Louw 1998) has 
articulated the conformity commanded by Ubuntu as follows: 
“Discursive rationality is overwhelmed by emotional identity, by the 
obsession to identify with and by the longing to conform to. To agree is 
more important than to disagree; conformity is cherished more than 
innovation. Tradition is venerated, continuity revered, change feared and 
differences shunned. Heresies [i.e. the innovative creations of intellectual 
African individuals, or refusal to participate in communalism] are not 
tolerated in such communities.”  
These considerations pertaining to Ubuntu are a significant statement 
about a large segment the multicultural South African society: a society 
that contains elements of both Western liberalism and African 
communitarianism. The practice of medicine and the emphasis placed 
upon autonomy, especially in respect of informed consent in which an 
individual is required to make his or her own decision has little in common 
with the social conformity characteristic of the African Ubuntu tradition. 
What is legally and morally compelling to a Western physician may be less 
important and altogether less explicable to those raised in African 
tradition. To regard informed consent as a duty to be imposed upon an 
individual with little awareness of individual autonomy would amount to a 
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failure to understand the context of the patient. It is possible that 
individuals such as these may be manipulated into agreeing to 
interventions that are not in their interest or, at the other extreme, 
exposing them to paternalistic decisions. The competency of patients who 
judge issues from a communitarian perspective may also be called into 
question because the decisions reached by an individual may not appear 
to be consistent with their own best interest. Again, the context and 
narrative unity of an individual’s life lived in a particular social tradition 
must be incorporated into any judgements reached about the consent or 
otherwise granted for medical intervention. 
In conclusion, communitarianism at the very least limits the autonomous 
actions of individuals to those that are consistent with the welfare of 
society at large. In a more pervasive African form, it is a way of being 
that lacks self-awareness that subjugates the interests of the individual to 
those of society. 
Conclusion 
 
The preceding discussion shows the spectrum across which autonomy 
rights of the individual may be restricted. In the liberal individualist 
Western tradition, the restrictions to autonomy are largely those 
occasioned by the need to refrain from harming others and the necessary 
setbacks to the interests of individuals brought about by resource 
limitation.  
Communitarian interests, as discussed in the preceding paragraph raise 
more profound questions that challenge the very assumption of 
individuality.  
The practice of medicine has nevertheless migrated from a model of 
beneficence to one in which the autonomy-rights of the patient are 
manifestly dominant. Those elements that restrict the scope of 
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autonomous action challenge this a priori assumption of individual 
dominance. Yet in each circumstance justification is demanded before any 
aspect of autonomy may be discounted.  
The South African community is unique in diverse ways: it firstly reflects 
the juxtaposition of Western and African traditions – which are in some 
respects incommensurable. Secondly, South Africa faces severe financial 
challenges in meeting the demand for social services, including health 
care. Both these factors impose upon any a priori assumption of individual 
hegemony. The next chapter examines some South African clinical 
scenarios in which autonomy is restricted.   
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Chapter 5 
 
The justification for some 
infringements of autonomy in clinical 
medicine within the South African 
context 
 
That personal autonomy can be, and is, justifiably infringed is evident 
from the preceding discussion. Yet autonomy remains a foundational 
concept in Western thinking since the Enlightenment and any limitation to 
the scope of autonomy merits careful consideration because not all 
infringements of autonomy will be justifiable. To allow infringements that 
cannot be justified would be to deny the dignity of fellow human beings.  
In South African medical practice there are some circumstances where 
autonomy may be infringed that are generic to medical practice globally 
and other circumstances that are unique to South Africa. This discussion 
will focus on several of these situations, combining case history and 
descriptive information with ethical analysis aimed at determining how 
justifiable evident infringements of autonomy may be. The discussion will 
include aspects pertaining to the application of the South African Mental 
Health Act, case history and discussion related to the Choice of 
Termination of Pregnancy Act, some considerations pertaining to 
involuntary incarceration of people with infectious diseases, especially 
extremely drug resistant tuberculosis and finally some discussion about 
research ethics in African Countries. 
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Coercive treatment:  the South African Mental Health Care Act 
 
This first example of justifiably infringed autonomy concerns the radical 
loss of autonomy brought about through involuntary hospitalization.  
The South African Mental Health Care Act is a multifaceted document 
describing the circumstances under which psychiatrists and other mental 
health practitioners may conduct clinical practice in South Africa. In 
common with other such international guidelines, it makes provision inter 
alia for involuntary hospitalization of mentally ill patients under prescribed 
conditions. Szasz (2003: 1449) has pointed out that, in general, the 
provisions of mental health law bring  
“The avowed desires of patients and doctors (into) conflict more often in 
psychiatry than in any other branch of medicine”.  
The prima facie obligation to respect patient autonomy is directly called 
into question by the provisions of this type of legislation.  
a. Provisions of the South African Mental Health Care Act of 2002 
The relevant aspects of the Act pertain to involuntary treatment. These 
provisions are contained in section 32 of the Act and are cited as follows: 
“A mental health care user must be provided with care, treatment and 
rehabilitation services without his or her consent at a health establishment 
on an outpatient or inpatient basis if- 
(a) an application in writing is made to the head of the health establishment 
concerned to obtain the necessary care, treatment and rehabilitation 
services and the application is granted; 
(b) at the time of making the application, there is reasonable belief that the 
mental health care user has a mental illness of such a nature that 
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(i) the user is likely to inflict serious harm to himself or herself or others; or 
(ii) care, treatment and rehabilitation of the user is necessary for the 
protection of the financial interests or reputation of the user; and  
(c) at the time of the application the mental health care user is incapable of 
making an informed decision on the need for the care, treatment and 
rehabilitation services and is unwilling to receive the care, treatment and 
rehabilitation required.” 
In section 33, the Act specifies who may apply to have the user 
committed for involuntary care: 
“(1) (a) An application for involuntary care, treatment and rehabilitation 
services may only be made by the spouse, next of kin, partner, associate, 
parent or guardian of a mental health care user, but where the – 
(i) user is below the age of 18 years on the date of the application, the 
application must be made by the parent or guardian of the user; or 
(ii) spouse, next of kin, partner, associate, parent or guardian of the user is 
unwilling, incapable or is not available to make such application, the 
application may be made by a health care provider. 
(b) The applicants referred to in paragraph (a) must have seen the mental 
health care user within seven days before making the application. 
(2) Such application must be made in the prescribed manner, and must set 
out the relationship of the applicant to the mental health care user;” 
On admission, assessment by two practitioners is required and if 
involuntary treatment is considered necessary, the user must be referred 
to a psychiatric hospital within 48 hours. Once admitted to a psychiatric 
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hospital, further formal assessment is required within 72 hours of 
admission. Treatment is continued for as long as it is deemed necessary 
or until the ‘user’ is considered to have regained their competency. In 
section 38 of the Act, this is set out as follows: 
“Recovery of capacity of involuntary mental health care users to make 
informed decisions 
38. (1) If the head of a health establishment is of the opinion from personal 
observation, information obtained or on receipt of representations by the 
user that an involuntary mental health care user is capable of making 
informed decisions, he or she must enquire from the user whether the user is 
willing to voluntarily continue with the care, treatment and rehabilitation 
services. 
(2) If the involuntary mental health care user consents to further care, 
treatment and rehabilitation services, section 25 applies. 
(3) If the involuntary mental health care user is unwilling to continue with 
care, treatment and rehabilitation services and the head of the health 
establishment is satisfied that the user no longer has a mental illness as 
referred to in section 32(b), the head of the health establishment concerned 
must immediately cause the user to be discharged according to accepted 
clinical practices.” 
The Act does not define “informed decision” and considers mental illness 
to be “a positive diagnosis of a mental health related illness in terms of 
accepted diagnostic criteria made by a mental health care practitioner 
authorised to make such a diagnosis”. The Act therefore makes provision 
for involuntary care that by definition constitutes an infringement of 
individual autonomy rights.  
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A clinical case history will be used to illustrate the application of this Act 
and the ethical arguments pertaining to the application of this Act. 
b. Case History  
Ms P was admitted to a state hospital in the early hours of the morning, 
having been brought to hospital by the police, a trauma counsellor and 
the paramedics who had been asked to intervene by Ms P’s estranged 
husband. Ms P had threatened to commit suicide and was found at home, 
surrounded by knives, in an aggressive state. Sedation given by the 
paramedics allowed her to be transferred to hospital where she was again 
sedated because of severely aggressive behaviour. Her next of kin (the 
estranged husband) could not be contacted and the medical officer on 
duty completed a “form 4” which allows involuntary hospitalization for the 
purposes of psychiatric assessment in terms of the South African Mental 
Health Care Act (SAMHCA). 
Ms P was then admitted to a “safe room”, which is a detention room 
within the hospital. 
The following morning, Ms P was interviewed by another medical officer. 
Ms P was reluctant to talk to the doctor but divulged that she was suicidal 
because her husband had left her for another woman. She declared that 
she was no longer suicidal and wanted to go home. The medical officer 
recorded that Ms P’s demeanour was calm and rational and there were no 
symptoms of psychotic illness. Because the referral to hospital had been 
initiated by Ms P’s estranged husband to whom she had disclosed her 
suicidal intentions, the night before, the medical officer suggested to Ms P 
(who agreed) that it would be useful to discuss the problem with her 
estranged husband prior to discharge. At this point Ms P asked to smoke 
a cigarette, a request refused by the doctor. Ms P became agitated, 
hurling a chair against the door of the safe room, as the doctor left the 
room. 
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The medical officer subsequently phoned Ms P’s estranged husband and 
obtained information that Ms P had previous admissions to a psychiatric 
institution where a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder had been 
made. He reported that Ms P was becoming increasingly violent and that 
she had assaulted him in various ways previously; because of these 
assaults, he had applied for a protection order against her. He had 
requested police assistance the night before because of repeated 
messages from her that she intended to commit suicide. With this 
information in hand the doctor concluded that Ms P had poor impulse 
control and was a danger to herself and others and would merit  further 
assessment at a psychiatric institution. Consequently, a “form 5” was 
completed in terms of the SAMHCA and Ms P was sent to the institution in 
question the same day, without her consent. 
Three days later, the same doctor was approached by a hitherto 
unidentified member of the public (Ms M) with a request for assistance. 
The story related to the medical officer was that Ms M (and her children) 
were being threatened and harassed by another woman (Ms P), who had 
recently been discharged from a psychiatric institution. On further 
questioning, it became evident that Ms M was the girlfriend of Ms P’s 
estranged husband and that the harassment had consisted of her home 
being invaded by Ms P who verbally abused her and her children. Ms M 
was concerned for her own safety and that of her children. A legal 
protection order had been sought by Ms M, but not yet implemented.  
The medical officer advised Ms M that if Ms P was harassing her and was 
thought to be mentally ill, then she could press legal charges against Ms P 
and could also fill out a “form 4” in terms of the South African Mental 
Health Act which would compel the police service to identify Ms P and 
request her attendance at the hospital for a further mental health 
assessment; failing voluntary compliance, the police would be obliged to 
detain Ms P against her will for the same purposes. 
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The “form 4” was duly completed by Ms M and Ms P was brought back to 
the state hospital by the police trauma counsellor. A consultant 
psychiatrist assessed her the same day and noted that Ms P was now 
living with her mother and had custody of her own children. The 
assessment further noted an absence of any psychotic or suicidal ideation 
and recorded Ms P’s affirmation that she was able to control her own 
impulses and that there was no evidence of manipulative behaviour. The 
interview further documented Ms P’s acceptance of responsibility for her 
own actions, including any antisocial actions. The consultant concluded 
that Ms P had a borderline personality disorder and mild depression with 
good insight; voluntary or involuntary admission was deemed 
unnecessary and follow-up organised through the services of both a 
psychologist and a psychiatrist.   
c. Infringement of autonomy on psychiatric grounds: the moral 
issues  
The actions of Ms P in this case are centred on her threat of suicide and 
on her alleged intrusive and sometimes violent behaviour towards others. 
The intervention sought in this case was the involuntary restraint and 
treatment of Ms P. The issues of violent anti-social behaviour brought 
about by mental illness and suicidality will be dealt with separately 
although the intervention sought in both circumstances amounts to a 
denial of Ms P’s autonomy.   
Anti-social behaviour 
To deny someone their right to autonomous action in the face of anti-
social behaviour is a self-evident and accepted limitation to the autonomy 
of any individual. 
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Deontological ethics 
In terms of ethical theory, Kantians would demand respect for the dignity 
of rational human beings; every person would need to be seen as an end 
in themselves and not merely the means to some other end. Kantian 
ethics would not justify the actions of Ms P against others because any 
violence perpetrated against others would both harm their interests and 
make them subservient to the will of the perpetrator. An individual, 
perpetrating harm, would expose themselves to the process of the law, 
retributivism and punishment. However, Kantian theory would not seek to 
suppress individual autonomy, even in this circumstance; it would rather 
entail respecting the agency of the autonomous human being and then 
holding him responsible for his actions. The prevention of harm by pre-
empting the expression of individual will is also denied in some of Kant’s 
own examples of how the moral law is applied: the case of the inquiring 
murderer is an instant where any breach of principle (by lying to save the 
life of an innocent person) is denied, even when dire consequences were 
likely to follow12. This example is seen as one which demonstrates the 
inflexibility of the Kantian view by showing how it contradicts common-
sense morality. For Kant, however, autonomy was beyond infringement 
and the existence of morality depended upon the possibility of choosing to 
do the right thing 
Despite the Kantian injunction to respect autonomy, the idea of autonomy 
itself requires the capacity for rational action. This was obviously 
pertinent to Ms P and is also pertinent to any person with disturbed 
cognitive capacity. Ms P had a diagnosed psychiatric disorder and her 
capacity for rational behaviour needed to be carefully weighed before 
considering her capable of autonomous action. The determination of 
competency has been addressed in chapters two and three; varying levels 
of incompetence are used to define whether someone is able to give 
                                                            
12
 The “Case of the Inquiring Murderer” was the subject of an interchange between Kant and one of his 
contemporaries who took issue with his insistence that absolute rules were the necessary basis of 
morality. This case is described and discussed in Rachels (2007: 124). 
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informed consent: understanding and rational deliberation are all 
attributes necessary to the process of informed consent. In Ms P’s case, 
her initial presentation with severely violent agitation and suicidal intent 
would indicate that she was indeed incompetent at the time she was 
admitted. It is notable that the Act does not define what constitutes 
competency or an ‘informed decision’; such judgements are thus left in 
the hands of the attending physicians with the need to test for 
competency clearly defined in section 32(c) as well as in section 38 of the 
Act. Those who are competent and therefore responsible for their actions 
are dealt with by the provisions of ordinary criminal and civil law and in 
Ms P’s case, this was exactly the point upon which the consultant 
psychiatrist saw fit to discharge Ms P for further outpatient follow-up. The 
moral obligations of the practitioners called upon to carry out the 
stipulations of the Act require them therefore to concentrate on the issue 
of competency because the Act only mandates involuntary care on the 
basis of incompetence in the setting of mental illness. In this case, there 
is sufficient reason to argue that Ms P’s involuntary detention was 
justified and that her autonomy was not infringed in the process because 
she was incapable of making an informed decision at the time of her 
admission. Her circumstances are representative of any person with 
mental illness detained against their wishes providing the stipulations of 
the Act are correctly applied. 
Setting aside considerations that pertain to the act of her detention, 
further deliberation is necessary when defining whether Ms P’s autonomy 
may have been justifiably or unjustifiably infringed by the circumstances 
of her detention. Self-governance consists of a spectrum of decisions 
about the way in which we choose to live our lives, not all of which are 
material to the welfare of others - or even of any life-sustaining 
significance to ourselves: the process of overruling Ms P’s autonomy 
should have been limited to those aspects of her behaviour that 
constituted a danger either to herself or those around her. Competency 
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and autonomy vary over time and in respect of the task at hand. The law 
mandates intervention and sets limits to the intervention by establishing 
criteria for mandatory re-appraisal and further management, but it fails to 
define criteria according to which the remaining aspects of patient 
autonomy are to be recognised and protected. Having been detained 
against her will places the patient in the power of individuals who 
represent the state; their commitment to recognize the autonomy of the 
patient is a moral issue to be decided by each individual practitioner and 
includes the patient’s right to communication, visitation, privacy and 
economic rights. In Ms P’s case, the procedures laid down by law were 
followed and her freedom and full autonomy were rapidly restored; 
however, during her period of detention there is little information 
available regarding the way in which she was treated. This is of concern 
and any infringement of the patient’s right to self-governance beyond that 
which is absolutely necessary would not be justified.  
Utilitarian theory    
The utilitarian evaluation of autonomy in the context of this case would be 
constructed around the aggregate interests of all involved, seeking above 
all else the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. The 
gratification of individual desires would not be justifiable if the 
consequences of the actions performed by Ms P were detrimental to the 
interests of those around her. The intervention carried out by the medical 
authorities with the intention of preventing Ms P from harassing or 
harming those close to her would be justified by the net utility of the 
intervention. As described in chapter four, beneficence is the 
underpinning principle of utilitarian theory and is in itself sometimes 
argued to be a justifiable reason for overruling autonomy. Utilitarians 
would differ from Kantian ethicists in this circumstance because they 
would see a moral obligation of preventing harm to others that 
supersedes the autonomy rights of Ms P. Even if Ms P were fully 
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autonomous and competent, the obligation to prevent harm would have 
made intervention morally obligatory.   
Communitarian philosophy 
Communitarian philosophy would find anti-social conduct antithetical to 
the interests of society. The autonomy of the individual would not be of 
primary concern and what ought to be done about anti-social behaviour 
would be measured against the intentions of the agent making decisions. 
Those restricting Ms P’s actions acted out of concern for the safety of 
those around them and their actions were justifiable for that reason. 
However, the obligation of those intervening may be seen to extend 
beyond that of preventing harm to others; understanding the narrative 
unity of Ms P’s life would also be required because it would indicate the 
basis of her behaviour, rooted as it was in the loss she sustained when 
her partner left her. Having that appreciation in mind, virtue ethics would 
require that any intervention contemplated should also provide therapy 
aimed at alleviating Ms P’s suffering, possibly by means of psychotherapy. 
The autonomous character of an action would be of less concern to virtue 
ethicists than the reasons for the action and they would support the role 
of professionals acting within the scope of their practice in the interests of 
the broader community and Ms P herself.  
Principlist ethical reasoning 
A principlist approach to the case in question would begin by considering 
the obligation to respect the autonomy of others as a prima facie 
obligation that could be over-ruled by other competing principles. 
Autonomy would ordinarily require us to allow Ms P to determine her own 
conduct and treatment in so far as it affected her and her alone. When 
the scope of autonomous action allowed others to be harmed, the 
principle of beneficence was exercised in protection of those who may be 
harmed even if that meant a setback to the interests and intentions of Ms 
P. ‘Autonomous’ action on the part of Ms P would, however, need to be 
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scrutinized given her background history of psychiatric illness and the 
preceding discussion about competency would necessitate a judgement 
about Ms P’s autonomy. No conflict of prima facie principles would need to 
be invoked if Ms P was incompetent. In her case, it would appear that Ms 
P suffered from episodes of emotional stress in which she failed to control 
her impulses and became capable of violent behaviour. The prior 
diagnosis of borderline personality disorder made in her case indicated a 
susceptibility to affective instability, impulsivity and suicidality – all of 
which are characteristics of this condition, described in the DSM (The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders published by the 
American Psychiatric Association). Ms P would be viewed as an individual 
with fluctuating competency and autonomy. Her episodes of anti-social 
behaviour during periods of affective instability would justify involuntary 
care without any infringement of autonomy. 
In conclusion, the Act under which Ms P was admitted is inclined to a 
Kantian view of antisocial behaviour because it emphasizes the issue of 
competency as the criterion justifying involuntary treatment and because 
it stresses the immediate restoration of liberty and full autonomy to 
individuals who show evidence of being competent. In substance, 
therefore, although the Act allows individuals to be held against their will, 
there is no evidence that this amounts to an infringement of personal 
autonomy.  
What is morally questionable is the notion that the autonomous interests 
of the individual being treated against his or her will are not fully 
protected by the informed consent of surrogates; nor is the scope of the 
restrictions applied to the autonomy of the individual clearly defined. 
These are significant omissions to an Act that allows psychiatric care to be 
provided in a way that no other branch of medicine may be practiced, 
either legally or morally. There is little protection for the interests of the 
individual and in expressing a related concern in the context of 
international models of psychiatric care, Szasz (2003: 1449) has pointed 
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out that both the American and English legal systems maintain a “fiction” 
that those responsible for committing a “loved one” have a caring 
relationship with the person committed. Szasz (2003: 1450), however, 
argues that the family is all too often “a source of the most insidious 
danger” to the incarcerated member of the family. He extends the same 
argument to the possibility of an individual being legally bound to accept 
treatment from a psychiatrist appointed by the state under circumstances 
where there is no reason to assume (as the law does) that the appointed 
doctor will necessarily maintain a therapeutic relationship of care in 
respect of the detained individual. 
The autonomous interests of individuals may be unjustifiably infringed by 
the practice of psychiatric intervention but not through the act of 
involuntary detention. The infringements, if they occur, follow 
hospitalization and only an awareness of moral behaviour on the part of 
the attending physicians may prevent this from happening.  
Suicidality 
Where no harm to others is risked, the provisions of the Act allow 
individuals to be admitted against their will, for their own protection. All 
the preceding discussion about competency applies to the justifiability of 
involuntary admissions for this reason. In addition to these 
considerations, other ethical arguments may also pertain.  
Deontological ethics 
Suicidality would not be condoned by a Kantian ethicist. Kant writes in the 
Groundwork to the Metaphysic of Morals that the self-love through which 
an individual may decide that the continuation of life threatens more evil 
than it promises pleasure could never become a universal law of nature 
simply because such laws are aimed at stimulating the furtherance of life 
and not its destruction (Kant 1785: 5313). By this view, suicidality is in 
                                                            
13
 See footnote 3 for details on the page cited 
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breach of the categorical imperative and therefore morally indefensible. 
The issue of autonomy is not superseded by this consideration and a 
Kantian ethicist would persist in judging the action of suicide to be wrong 
while still respecting the right of the individual to make an autonomous 
choice between right and wrong. By this reasoning, the application of the 
Act would be judged on the basis of whether or not the person admitted 
in terms of its provisions was competent or not.   
Utilitarian theory    
Utilitarianism would seek the greatest happiness for the greatest number 
of people by rejecting interference in the lives of individuals. The issue of 
attempted suicide usually entails the intervention of others seeking to 
prevent an individual from bringing harm to him or herself. John Stuart 
Mill (1859 / 2006: 16), believing that the happiness of individuals 
depended substantially on their freedom from external authority, claimed 
that the entire extent of legitimate authority exercised by the state 
against individuals was confined to preventing people from harming one 
another. The state had no licence to intervene in the lives of individuals in 
any sort of paternalistic way, even when they put their own lives at risk. 
The only qualification allowed to his principle was that temporary 
intervention to prevent suicide could be justified in order to establish that 
the deed was indeed the autonomously-made decision of a rational being. 
Under such circumstances, the scope of involuntary detention and 
treatment would only be justifiable for brief periods of time and with 
specific goals in mind. In Ms P’s case, the initial commitment under the 
Act would have been justifiable but subsequent intervention would not be 
defendable, were it to be based upon suicidality alone. In general, 
utilitarians would therefore consider preventing someone from committing 
suicide an unjustified setback to their interests, not because it infringed 
autonomy but because it did not adhere to the single principle of utility, 
expressed as happiness founded upon freedom from external authority.   
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Principlist ethical reasoning 
Principlists would also address the issue based upon competency. 
Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 188) have argued that beneficence 
justifies intervention to prevent suicide and consider intervention 
symbolically significant because it is an  expression of communal concern 
over attempted suicide; they do nevertheless concede that in some 
circumstances suicide is justifiable and should be allowed to happen, even 
with the assistance of others; however, in Ms P’s case, there were 
significant concerns about her impulsivity and competency that made 
intervention to prevent her from killing herself justifiable. In the absence 
of substantial autonomy, beneficent intervention would be clearly 
applicable; however, according to the principlist view, both suicide and 
intervention to prevent suicide may be justifiable in the case of competent 
people, although the latter would necessarily involve overruling the 
autonomy rights of the individual. To do so would be an acceptable 
infringement of a prima facie principle, even if the resultant action left 
traces of moral regret.   
The principle of beneficence would also apply to therapy aimed at 
ameliorating the effects of poor impulse control and depression. This 
treatment usually requires the informed consent of the patient and in Ms 
P’s case beneficence would not justify involuntary treatment because her 
fluctuating levels of competency would still allow the discussion of 
psycho-pharmacotherapy at a time when Ms P could make an 
autonomous choice; the medical practitioners confronted by her 
emergency admission, however, would have had an obligation of 
beneficence in pursuing counselling about psychotherapy and psycho-
pharmacotherapy. In Ms P’s case this happened with follow-up being 
organised by both a psychologist and a psychiatrist. Again, the Act is 
inconsistent with the general moral requirement that autonomous 
authorisation be sought from individuals or their surrogates before 
instituting treatment.    
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In summary, the Kantian view can never be invoked in defence of any 
breach of autonomous action; nor, can it be used to justify intervention in 
the prevention of suicide. The utilitarians would view attempted suicide as 
an action against which only temporary intervention could be justified, but 
not for reasons of respecting patient autonomy. Principlists, following the 
arguments advanced by Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 188), would 
find reasons of beneficence sufficient justification for overruling the prima 
facie principle of respect for patient autonomy.  
These conclusions and the South African law should be seen in the 
context of broader international conventions. Tannsjo (2004: 430) has 
used the stipulations of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
of 1996 as a basis for discussing the grounds that may be advanced for 
‘coercive treatment’. This Convention only supports coercive treatment of 
a patient with a mental disorder where that disorder will result in serious 
harm to the affected individual themselves. Harm accruing to others is 
regarded as insufficient justification for coercive intervention. Tannsjo 
(2004: 431) further reflects on the application of the Convention to 
patients with psychiatric illness; three possible ways of applying the 
Convention are considered: the first possibility is that coercive treatment 
should be provided based solely upon the needs of the patient; the 
second iteration restricts coercive treatment to conditions considered life-
threatening in the absence of intervention. The third option justifies all 
forms of involuntary treatment on the basis of incompetency. Tannsjo 
(2004: 431) concludes that the incompetency model is the most 
defendable model and that mental illness in itself is no reason for coercive 
intervention, even in the face of suicidality. These arguments deny 
beneficence as a basis for coercive intervention; they also deny utility and 
in placing autonomy and competency at the center of judgements about 
what is acceptable, endorse a Kantian perspective. The South African 
Mental Health Care Act is consistent with this view and may be more 
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morally defendable than similar laws in other Western Countries (Sweden, 
Italy, Germany).  
In dealing with the dangerously insane, Tannsjo (2004: 433) further 
argues that full legal responsibility should be endorsed with coercive 
treatment reserved for the incompetent. Tannsjo argues that psychiatrists 
should not be legally responsible for incarcerating those mentally-ill 
people for whom no cure exists and that there ought to be a clear 
distinction between punishment and treatment. These views differ from 
the stipulations set out by the SAMHCA and Tannsjo (2004: 434) 
acknowledges that the full responsibility model is very controversial; in 
the circumstances of the current case, Tannsjo’s arguments are all 
morally directly applicable, especially with regard to their emphasis on 
competency. 
In conclusion, the South African Law (the Mental Health Care Act) 
emphasizes and protects the function of personal autonomy and does not 
mandate any breach of Kantian principle either for the benefit of the 
individual or society. However, other moral theories provide no support 
for the idea that the autonomy of the individual psychiatric patient should 
primarily determine what ought to be done where the interests of the 
individual may be affected by his or her own actions or even where the 
interests of society are put at risk through the actions of individuals. 
Hence the morally justifiable limits to the personal autonomy of 
psychiatrically-ill people exceed the stipulations of the law which curtails 
the extent of social intervention against the individual. That this is so, in 
the South African context, reflects the dominance of Western intellectual 
values within the legislative framework of the country. 
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Maternal – Fetal conflict and the South African Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act  
 
Having seen how the law protects competent individuals from being 
treated against their will for psychiatric illness, the second example is one 
where the autonomy rights of individual women come into conflict with 
interests of their unborn children. 
The decision to end a pregnancy may be made for a number of reasons. 
These include the possibility of harm accruing to the interests of the fetus, 
harm accruing to the interests of the pregnant woman or because it is her 
desire to end an early pregnancy. Setting aside incompetent pregnant 
women, the request to end a pregnancy is always a direct extension of 
the will of the pregnant woman and in such circumstances it is her 
autonomous will that may be tested against the rights and interests of the 
unborn child. The practice of abortion is regulated by the law although the 
moral question of whether the autonomy of the pregnant woman has 
justifiable limitations remains the subject of debate. The arguments 
supporting and limiting the autonomy of the pregnant woman will be 
presented in the discussion of an illustrative case report. The relevant 
provisions of the Act will be briefly reviewed prior to this.    
a. Provisions of the Act 
The Act entrenches the right of the pregnant woman to make autonomous 
decisions about her pregnancy with the option of ending the pregnancy 
being at her behest alone up to 12 weeks and thereafter for reasons 
pertaining to any adverse risk that could arise because of the pregnancy. 
This adverse risk, construed as either a risk to the pregnant woman 
herself or her child, would be sufficient grounds for termination of the 
pregnancy providing two other practitioners support the termination on 
the stipulated legal grounds. The relevant sections of the Act are the 
following:  
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 “Recognising that the Constitution protects the right of persons to make 
decisions concerning reproduction and to security in and control over their 
bodies...”   and,   
“2.  A pregnancy may be terminated -  
(a) upon request of a woman during the first 12 weeks of the gestation 
period of her pregnancy; 
(b) from the 13th up to and including the 20th week of the gestation period 
if a medical practitioner, after consultation with the pregnant woman, is of 
the opinion that- 
(i) the continued pregnancy would pose a risk of injury to the woman's 
physical or mental health; or 
(ii) there exists a substantial risk that the fetus would suffer from a             
severe physical or mental abnormality; or 
(iii) the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest; or 
(iv) the continued pregnancy would significantly affect the social or             
economic circumstances of the woman; or 
(c) after the 20th week of the gestation period if a medical practitioner, 
after consultation with another medical practitioner or a registered midwife, 
is of the opinion that the continued pregnancy- 
          (i) would endanger the woman's life; 
         (ii) would result in a severe malformation of the fetus; or 
        (iii) would pose a risk of injury to the fetus. 
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Subject to the provisions of subsections (4) and (5), the termination of a 
pregnancy may only take place with the informed consent of the pregnant  
woman. 
 (2) Notwithstanding any other law or the common law, but subject to the  
provisions of subsections (4) and (5), no consent other than that of the 
pregnant woman shall be required for the termination of a pregnancy. 
 (3) In the case of a pregnant minor, a medical practitioner or a registered 
midwife, as the case may be, shall advise such minor to consult with her 
parents, guardian, family members or friends before the pregnancy is 
terminated:  Provided that the termination of the pregnancy shall not be 
denied because such minor chooses not to consult them. 
 (4) Subject to the provisions of subsection (5), in the case where a woman 
is- 
(a) severely mentally disabled to such an extent that she is completely        
incapable of understanding and appreciating the nature or consequences of 
a termination of her pregnancy; or 
(b) in a state of continuous unconsciousness and there is no reasonable 
prospect that she will regain consciousness in time to request and to 
consent to the termination of her pregnancy in terms of section 2, her 
pregnancy may be terminated during the first 12 weeks of the gestation 
period, or from the 13th up to and including the 20th week of the gestation 
period on the grounds set out in section 2(1)(b)- 
(i) upon the request of and with the consent of her natural guardian, spouse 
or legal guardian, as the case may be; or 
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(ii) if such persons cannot be found, upon the request and with the             
consent of her curator personae: 
 Provided that such pregnancy may not be terminated unless two medical 
practitioners or a medical practitioner and a registered midwife who has 
completed the prescribed training course consent thereto. 
 (5) Where two medical practitioners or a medical practitioner and a 
registered midwife who has completed the prescribed training course, are of 
the  opinion that- 
(a) during the period up to and including the 20th week of the gestation 
period of a pregnant woman referred to in subsection (4)(a) or (b) - 
(i) the continued pregnancy would pose a risk of injury to the woman's 
physical or mental health; or 
(ii) there exists a substantial risk that the fetus would suffer from a             
severe physical or mental abnormality; or 
(b) after the 20th week of the gestation period of a pregnant woman 
referred to in subsection (4)(a) or (b), the continued pregnancy- 
          (i) would endanger the woman's life; 
         (ii) would result in a severe malformation of the fetus; or 
        (iii) would pose a risk of injury to the fetus, they may consent to the             
termination of the pregnancy of such woman after consulting her natural 
guardian, spouse, legal guardian or curator personae, as the case may be:  
Provided that the termination of the pregnancy shall not be denied if the 
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natural guardian, spouse, legal guardian or curator personae, as the case 
may be, refuses to consent thereto.” 
The articles of the Act stipulate no upper limit for the duration of 
pregnancy at which termination of the pregnancy may be legally 
procured. The articles of the Act also make no reference to the 
consequences of the procedure for the fetus: neither the possibility of 
livebirth or stillbirth are contemplated and there is no reference to the act 
of fetocide (killing the baby in utero by means of a lethal injection) prior 
to termination of the pregnancy. 
b. Case History 
Ms NH was admitted to the Groote Schuur Hospital Maternity Unit under 
the provisions of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act of 1996 for 
the purposes of terminating her pregnancy. 
Ms NH was a 21 year old woman who had previously given birth to two 
children, aged 4 and 6 years at the time of her admission. Neither of 
these children were cared for by her, the eldest being in the custody of 
his father and the younger living with Ms NH’s mother.  
Ms NH had a poor social history having lived on the street for more than a 
year  before going to live with her aunt in Mannenberg. She had a further 
history of both alcohol abuse and admitted to using TIK 
(methamphetamine).  
Ms NK was raped by an unknown assailant, as a result of which she 
developed suicidal depression leading to attempted suicide by means of a 
paracetamol overdose. She was initially looked after in the emergency 
unit at Jooste Hospital after which she was referred to the liaison 
psychiatry service at Groote Schuur Hospital. The evaluation carried out 
there suggested that Ms NH had persistent suicidal ideation and that the 
pregnancy that had been the result of the rape was partly responsible for 
her severe depression. The psychiatric opinion strongly suggested that 
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the ongoing pregnancy constituted a threat to her life and mental 
wellbeing and should be terminated immediately. 
As a consequence of this decision, Ms NH was referred to the gynaecology 
department where two consultants agreed that the circumstances merited 
termination of the pregnancy. 
In hospital, further evaluation revealed that the pregnancy was advanced 
beyond 20 weeks and that the estimated gestational age of the fetus was 
between 23 and 24 weeks. An induction of labour was commenced on the 
30 of September 2008 and ended with the delivery of a freshly stillborn 
female child weighing 760 grams on the 10th of October. The induction of 
labour proved to be abnormally protracted and by the time the child was 
delivered the pregnancy had progressed beyond the 24th week of 
gestation. 
Of note, the care of Ms NH during the induction of labour was provided by 
rotating teams of labour ward doctors, most of whom raised no ethical 
objection to the procedure in question. However, on the day before the 
delivery took place, both the doctors on duty decided that they disagreed 
with the procedure in question and expressed a desire not to be involved 
in the management of Ms NH. One of these two doctors was persuaded by 
the consultant on call that the resident staff had a duty of care to Ms NH 
who was some way into the process of ending the pregnancy; 
consequently Ms NH continued to receive care that night and delivered 
the next day.  
Ms NH was discharged soon after delivery, for follow-up by the psychiatric 
unit and social workers. 
c. The justifiable limits to personal autonomy in the setting of 
maternal – fetal conflict 
This case presents several issues: the first of these is whether or not it is 
permissible to kill a preterm fetus by ending a pregnancy prematurely in 
92 
 
order to save the life of its mother; the second is whether the rights of 
the child who is to be born ever supersedes the rights of the pregnant 
woman to pursue her own autonomous interests.   
Prior to reflecting on these issues, it is necessary to consider what 
“termination of pregnancy” might mean for the pregnant woman and the 
child-to-be-born. The terminology employed by the act governing medical 
intervention in pregnancy is not helpful, being defined in all but one 
respect, namely: what it means to carry out a ‘termination of pregnancy’.  
Conceptual analysis of this phrase will show that the process of ending a 
pregnancy is a technical issue with a range of consequences, depending 
on the gestational age at which the pregnancy ends. These consequences 
range from the surgical removal of a very young conceptus showing few 
identifiable characteristics of being a human fetus, and no signs of life to 
the delivery of a child clearly discernable as an anatomically fully-
developed human being, with or without signs of life.  
To terminate a pregnancy, as such, implies no stipulation regarding the 
circumstances of a child’s birth and fails to imply any particular outcome 
for the child after birth. Hence, an example may be made of a termination 
of pregnancy carried out for severe hypertension in pregnancy which is 
aimed at ending the pregnancy for the sake of the pregnant woman and 
may result in the delivery of preterm child who has the capacity to 
survive. 
Terminating a pregnancy is not usually considered to be the same as 
killing a fetus. However, the consequence of carrying out a termination of 
pregnancy may lead to the death of a fetus or the death of a newborn 
child who is born alive but too premature to survive. As the preceding 
example illustrates, there is also a third possibility: terminating a 
pregnancy may result in the preterm delivery of a child that has grown 
sufficiently to have a statistical (and actual) chance of surviving 
premature birth. The possibility of neonatal survival becomes increasingly 
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likely the further the pregnancy has progressed at the time it is ended. 
Hence, terminating a pregnancy may result in the delivery of a child who 
survives but may also be seen as ending the life of a fetus or that of a 
newborn child.   
In terms of the South African law, the purposes of the Act are defined in 
terms that aver termination of pregnancy as a form of contraception, 
stating in the preamble:  
“Believing that termination of pregnancy is not a form of contraception or 
population control...”,  
Instead, it chooses to argue that the parents have a ‘right’ to ‘fertility 
regulation’:  
“Recognising that both women and men have the right to be informed of 
and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of 
fertility regulation of their choice” 
This implies that the number of children reared by a woman and her 
partner may be legitimately controlled, partly by invoking the provisions 
of the act in question. Hence the act legitimizes practices that may end in 
the death of a fetus or the death of a newborn child or the delivery of a 
child that survives, with or without the handicaps associated with preterm 
birth, and does so in the interests of fertility regulation. In this context 
any child surviving such a pregnancy would be, by definition, unwanted. 
The Act therefore renders legal those actions that may have harmful 
effects not only on the fetus but also on the child to be born. The 
arguments concerning the moral status of the fetus compared to the 
newborn child will not be examined here; suffice be it to say that killing a 
fetus is different to killing a newborn child and to find moral justification 
for terminating a pregnancy is less compelling the less likely it is that 
pregnancy termination will end in the death of a child (in other words: 
moral justification becomes increasingly difficult as the risk of preterm 
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delivery ending in neonatal survival increases the closer the pregnancy is 
to the limit of biological viability – which is usually described to be 24 
weeks of gestational age).  
Moral justification for ending a pregnancy is also more easily found where 
beneficence can be invoked as a necessary principle in supporting the life 
and welfare of the pregnant woman or her child. Hence, ending a 
pregnancy may be deemed necessary under circumstances where the 
pregnancy is desired but the termination of pregnancy is carried out in 
the interests of the pregnant woman’s physical or mental health or where 
there is significant risk of the child suffering as a result of being born 
disabled. The death of the fetus or newborn child under these 
circumstances may be an unintended consequence of ending the 
pregnancy. This is the classical situation where the rule of double effect 
may be invoked. Beauchamp and Childress (2001:129) have described 
the criteria that would justify this type of harm (previously described in 
chapter four); briefly, these include a preponderance of good over bad 
effects and that the good effect isn’t achieved solely by inducing harm; in 
addition, the intentions of the physician have to be good. Within these 
stipulations, the autonomously-expressed wishes of the pregnant woman 
would prevail and the action of ending the pregnancy would be morally 
justifiable on the basis of respecting maternal autonomy and beneficence 
towards the pregnant woman and child. 
Pregnancy may, however, be ended where the pregnancy itself is 
undesired and the autonomous will of the pregnant woman is focussed on 
ending the pregnancy without her having to contemplate the possibility of 
rearing the child in question. Here, the harm that accrues to the interests 
of the fetus (or child to be) is not sustained by way of any unintended 
double effect: the death of the fetus or child is the consequence directly 
sought by interrupting the pregnancy. Such circumstances may prevail in 
cases of rape where the child itself is unwanted (as it is in this instance). 
With this conceptual analysis in mind, the moral question is focussed on 
95 
 
whether the pregnant woman’s desire to end the pregnancy as a means 
of killing the fetus is justifiable. The case in question is complicated by the 
suicidality of the pregnant woman, which poses additional questions.  
Deontological ethics 
The moral status of the pregnant woman as a rational, sentient being 
would demand recognition of her views and a Kantian approach would 
lead us to examine her request to end the pregnancy in the light of 
needing to treat every person as an end in themselves and not merely as 
the means to some other end; in addition the maxim applied would need 
to be universalizable. To refuse the pregnant woman’s request would 
assume that ends, other than those sought by her would be served by 
such a refusal. However, it would also be true that not all ends sought by 
others could be deemed to be desirable or universalizable; consequently 
there can be no endorsement of the ends of others where such purposes 
are unacceptable to society at large; furthermore, where the ends sought 
are dependent on the agency of others, they too would have the moral 
choice of either acceding or refusing such a request: Kantian ethics would 
deny neither the autonomy of the pregnant woman, nor that of those 
implicated in her care.  
Aside from the question of respecting autonomy, from a Kantian 
viewpoint, the issue of taking a life cannot be endorsed because it would 
not be in the interest of another human being, but is an act pursued in 
favour of the ends of others. No circumstantial or consequential 
considerations would mitigate this rule, even when adverse consequences 
might be reasonably foreseeable. 
Utilitarian theory    
Utilitarians would view the situation differently. Act-utilitarians would 
consider the consequences of ending the pregnancy and would have no 
difficulty in concluding that it is substantially in the pregnant woman’s 
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interest to end the pregnancy. The argument concerning the interests of 
the fetus would devolve to a consideration concerning the moral status of 
the fetus and the likelihood of the fetus suffering as a consequence of the 
pregnancy being ended. The fetus would be assigned a lesser moral 
status on the basis of an absence of reflective self-consciousness and an 
absence of any will regarding the future. Whereas utilitarians would never 
discount the significance of taking life, they would argue that it is a far 
less serious matter to take the life of a being lacking sentience than it is 
to end the life of an adult human being (Singer 2000: 156). Justification 
is required in order to kill and the consequences of killing this fetus would 
be justified by the pregnant woman’s circumstances. Although rule-
utilitarians may end up with a different view of killing in the sense that 
most people would be happier with the notion that no-one in society 
should be generally licensed to kill others without rigorous control, they 
would nevertheless have no difficulty in justifying this type of killing as 
one that society at large would endorse. Utilitarians, arguing from a 
consequentialist perspective, would also see no distinction between killing 
this fetus and terminating the pregnancy with the death of the neonate 
being a necessary consequence of extreme prematurity. They would 
therefore endorse, not only ending the pregnancy, but the practice of 
fetocide as well. The argument concerning suffering of the child would 
also be of concern to a utilitarian because the avoidable suffering of any 
being would require justification, if it is to be morally accepted. The 
extent of the suffering experienced by a fetus undergoing a lethal intra-
cardiac injection in utero, the suffering endured by a preterm infant facing 
an inevitable death and the possibility of suffering endured by a preterm 
baby surviving into childhood with some of the many disabling 
complications of severe prematurity are all pertinent to the utilitarian 
point of view. Whereas the utilitarian would have no difficulty putting the 
interests of the pregnant woman ahead of those the child, they would not 
wish the child to suffer any more than necessary. Allowing that some of 
the notions regarding suffering described above are scientifically poorly-
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characterised, the utilitarians would probably choose the option least-
likely to cause suffering to the fetus and the child. Hence, they would 
probably support the notion of fetocide before termination of pregnancy 
(this is, in fact, obstetric policy in the United Kingdom – that all 
pregnancies being ended after 22 weeks gestation, as therapeutic 
interventions for the benefit of the pregnant woman - or where lethal fetal 
anomalies are suspected, are preceded by lethal injection of intracardiac 
potassium chloride into the fetal myocardium14).  
The utilitarian viewpoint would thus seek to maximise the preferences of 
the greatest number of people who have any relevant interest in the case 
in question as the sole moral principle determining what ought to happen. 
Autonomy of the individual would not be an issue and the circumstances 
of this case as well as the consequences of ending the pregnancy happen 
to support the request of the pregnant woman whose interests would 
therefore be inadvertently advanced by utilitarian arguments.  
Communitarian philosophy 
A virtue ethicist would not seek to find a viewpoint based solely on the 
consequences of ending the pregnancy nor on the application of any 
particular rule. In the context of virtue ethics, what ought to be done will 
be measured against the intentions of the agent making the decision. The 
judgements made follow no prescribed rule, instead allowing decisions to 
be based upon right reason and made in the context of the narrative unity 
of the lives of both the pregnant woman and those who need to intercede 
on her behalf; in their lives the exercise of virtue or vice would determine 
the likelihood of right action. The narrative unity of the pregnant woman’s 
life will have been scripted without reference to pregnancy under 
circumstances such as these although there must also be some 
Sophoclean conflict inherent in her biological commitment to motherhood 
and her necessary rejection of all the manifestations of violence 
                                                            
14
 This recommendation has been made by the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists and is 
cited by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2006: 56).  
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perpetrated against her. A pregnancy as a result of rape would be seen to 
lie outside the ordinary narrative of her life and no-one could judge her 
any less favourably in her scripted social role in choosing to end a 
pregnancy such as this. Given her state of mind and the advice of the 
therapists caring for her, regardless of whether intervention would be 
clearly morally right, failure to intervene would be wrong. Virtue ethicists, 
in the mould of MacIntyre would also examine the intentions and actions 
of the medical team who assist in the process of procuring the 
termination of pregnancy. Here, the nature of the practice concerned 
needs examination. Where the practice of medicine is concerned with 
standards of excellence and conducted in the service of both internal and 
external goods, it leads to conduct based upon the relationships between 
those who subscribe to the practice and incorporates subordination to the 
judgement of others. It implies a concept of virtuous action within a 
particular social idiom, rather than leaving the decision of what ought to 
be done to the precept of the individual agent. Specifically, in this 
circumstance, it would require medicine to be practiced in the interests of 
the pregnant woman, her family and society, and with reference to both 
traditional and contemporary views of acceptable practice; in other words, 
the actions carried out serve the purposes of internal goods and are not 
(for example) predicated solely upon the question of financial 
remuneration for the practitioners concerned. In this case the actions, 
directed within the confines of professional practice, served the interests 
of the woman concerned and were consistent with good practice. In 
summary, the virtue ethicist provides little guidance on what ought to 
happen, leaving a far wider scope of actions permissible within the 
confines of a broadly-stated morality enshrined in the laws of the country.  
Again, the issue of autonomy does not define what is morally permissible 
for the virtue ethicist who would accede to or refuse the autonomously-
willed actions of the pregnant woman according to judgements that have 
no reference to the principle of autonomy. 
99 
 
Principlist ethical reasoning 
Principlists would find themselves weighing up the competing principles of 
respect for the autonomy of the pregnant woman (together with 
beneficent concern over her suicidality) against the principle of non-
maleficence towards the fetus. Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 397) 
describe a process of principle-based reasoning that incorporates both 
deductivist and inductivist approaches, brought into a “reflective 
equilibrium” by means of which conflicting judgements may be reconciled. 
Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 400) admit that such deliberation must 
depart from a starting point of considered judgements reflecting settled 
moral convictions or common morality; a common morality which, they 
argue, attracts greater social consensus than any theory of morality. 
These settled moral convictions of common morality are born of the 
intuition that we stand in a morally significant relationship to a number of 
our neighbours; relationships that create inalienable duties as well as 
actual or prima facie obligations. This theory, advanced originally by Ross 
(1939: 169) describes duties in several different categories including 
those arising from previous acts (duties of fidelity, reparation or 
gratitude); duties of justice arising from unfair distribution; duties of 
beneficence, non-maleficence and duties of self-improvement. These 
duties have been concertinaed into the four “principles” subsequently 
described by Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 402). The reflective 
equilibrium established by weighing competing prima facie principles will 
determine what ought to be done in a given situation. The principles 
overruled in this process do not lose their moral authority and in the 
process of being overruled they may leave traces of moral regret.  
By this reasoning, a principlist may examine the situation of the case in 
point from the perspective of beneficence towards the suicidal pregnant 
woman; her request to end the pregnancy would coincide with what 
beneficence would require of those providing care. Non-maleficence 
towards the fetus would be a justifiably overridden prima facie principle. 
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Autonomy of the individual would not necessarily prevail in the 
deliberations of principlists and as the consequences of ending the 
pregnancy became more serious for the fetus (for example, if the fetus 
had attained viability and delivery would have carried a risk of neonatal 
survival), the principlists would argue instead that the priniciple of non-
maleficence should prevail over the pregnant woman’s right to have her 
autonomous wishes respected. 
When the case in question is viewed in different social contexts, 
irreconcilable moral conflict may become evident. Whereas the pregnant 
woman sees the child and the pregnancy in the light of the assault 
perpetrated against her, those caring for her have no such context, 
seeing only a pregnant woman and her fetus. A paediatrician asked to 
care for a newborn child would not be able to discriminate between 
newborn children based upon the circumstances of their parents; they 
would not perceive one child as illegitimate when compared to another. 
The same conflict arises when an obstetrician is asked to end the life of 
one child while protecting the lives of all others of similar gestational age. 
Thus the moral conflict is inescapable and an acceptance of one course of 
action rather than another can only be made while acknowledging the loss 
of one principle or another. Consensus is attainable only to a limited 
extent and within the laws and traditions of social practice, some may 
choose to sacrifice one principle rather than another, although whatever 
course of action is chosen, inevitably, something will be lost. However, in 
considering the implications of the legislation pertaining to termination of 
pregnancy and the ethical arguments that may be adduced for and 
against abortion, it is apparent that the South African law is biased in 
favour of the autonomy of the pregnant woman; yet no moral law creates 
such a binding obligation to respect the wishes of the pregnant woman. 
The law fails to consider the implications of termination of pregnancy for 
the child to be born and in doing so fails to recognise the moral status of 
the fetus or the child to be born. In this circumstance, Kantian ethicists 
101 
 
would not endorse taking another (innocent) life, nor would they expect 
others to support the autonomous actions of those (including the 
pregnant woman) who chose to procure this abortion. Instead they would 
see such actions as morally wrong and to be dealt with through the law. 
Utilitarians would not disallow the actions of the pregnant woman 
although they would expect some limits to exist in terms of which the 
harm that may accrue from the procedure would be contained. Virtue 
ethicists would support the termination of pregnancy in this circumstance 
but only because it would be the right thing to do. Termination of 
pregnancy for lesser reasons would not necessarily be supported by virtue 
ethicists. Principlists would find in favour of the intervention only because 
of beneficence to the pregnant woman. The autonomy of the mother 
would be a prima facie interest that under other circumstances could be 
overruled by non-maleficence. Thus the legislation on the statute books 
has a liberal-individualist bias unsupported by moral argument with 
insufficient recognition given to the justifiable limitations on autonomy.  
In the context of the preceding case that examined people facing 
detention for psychiatric reasons, this case demonstrates again that 
personal autonomy may not be justifiably limited in terms of the law, 
which also has a liberal-individualist bias on the abortion issue. However, 
morally, arguments for the limitation of autonomy rights may be made 
and the endorsement of this termination of pregnancy by utilitarian, 
communitarian and principlist theory were sustained in spite of the 
pregnant woman’s personal autonomy and not because of it.    
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The management of extremely drug resistant tuberculosis 
 
So far, having seen no South African exceptions to the legal requirement 
to respect the autonomy of the individual, the next case examines the 
issue of personal autonomy when set against the interests of the 
community. 
The control of infectious diseases is an area of public health concern 
where the interests of the community may supersede those of the 
individual. Utilitarian arguments have been used to support measures that 
may infringe the rights of individuals in favour of benefitting the majority 
of the population. Even in the calculation of the greatest good, the harm 
incurred by some for the benefit of the majority has to be reconciled with 
the degree of harm caused. In common morality, limitless infringements 
of individual rights cannot be justified simply because the majority are 
likely to benefit. 
In South Africa, the mortality rate from tuberculosis (TB) has been 
climbing steadily and reached 218 / 100 000 population during 2006 
(World Health Organization 200815). It is the leading cause of mortality in 
the country, second only to HIV-AIDS. This has happened despite the 
existence of effective treatment. More recently, drug-resistant forms of 
the TB bacillus have been identified and an extremely drug resistant form 
of TB (XDR-TB) has emerged. XDR-TB has been managed by isolating 
individuals identified as carriers of the XDR-TB bacillus. Being 
incarcerated against their will resulted in some people escaping from 
centres of detention; they were subsequently pursued and re-
apprehended. This extreme measure has elicited moral and medical 
debate and faces the issue of how far the interests of the community can 
be advanced at the expense of the autonomous individual. 
                                                            
15
 The figures quoted are derived from data published by the World Health Organization and cited also by 
the Health Systems Trust whose website is to be found at http://www.hst.org.za/index.php. 
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Some of this debate will be illustrated with a selection of press-releases 
discussing the incarceration of the XDR-TB patients and then the ethical 
arguments will be presented. 
a. The nature of the problem presented by XDR-TB: scientific 
publications 
In January of 2007, Singh et al, publishing in the Public Library of Science 
Medicine journal, described the XDR-TB epidemic in South Africa, urging 
that there was no time for complacency or denial (Singh 2007: 0019). In 
this publication, Singh et al describes the nature of the problem presented 
by XDR-TB and also documents the high risk of mortality associated with 
the disease:  
“On September 1, 2006, the World Health Organisation (WHO) announced 
that a deadly new strain of extensively drug resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) 
had been detected in Tugela Ferry (Figure1), a rural town in the South 
African province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) [1], the epicentre of South Africa’s 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Of the 544 patients studied in the area in 2005, 221 had 
multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB), that is, Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis that is resistant to at least rifampicin and isoniazid. Of these 
221 cases, 53 were identified as XDR-TB (see Table 1 and [2]), i.e., MDR-TB 
plus resistance to at least three of the six classes of second-line agents 
[3].This reportedly represents almost one-sixth of all known XDR-TB cases 
reported worldwide [4]. Of the 53, 44 were tested for HIV and all were HIV 
infected.” (Singh 2007: 0019) 
“The median survival from the time of sputum specimen collection was 16 
days for 52 of the 53 infected individuals, including six health workers and 
those reportedly taking antiretrovirals [2]. Such a fatality rate for XDR-TB, 
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especially within such a relatively short period of time, is unprecedented 
anywhere in the world.” (Singh 2007: 0019) 
Singh et al continue to outline the extent of the risk presented by the 
development of XDR-TB, citing recommendations made by the World 
Health Organization: 
“In recognition of the global threat posed by these factors, on September 9, 
2006, WHO urged a response to the outbreak akin to recent global efforts to 
control severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and bird flu [14]. The 
South African government's initial lethargic reaction to the crisis [15,16] and 
uncertainty amongst South African health professionals concerning the 
ethical, social, and human rights implications of effectively tackling this 
outbreak [17,18] highlight the urgent need to address these issues lest 
doubt and inaction spawn a full-blown XDR-TB epidemic in South Africa and 
beyond.” (Singh 2007: 0020) 
Singh et al also concede that the number identified cases fell far short of 
the number of cases likely to be present in the community: 
“Diagnosed cases of XDR-TB likely represent a small proportion of the true 
extent of the problem. The number of persons harbouring latent infections is 
unknown (and likely unknowable at present). Official statistics also likely 
underestimate the true prevalence of XDR-TB, as the current national TB 
guidelines prescribe the conditions under which M. tuberculosis 
susceptibility testing should be done [13]. These guidelines recommend 
susceptibility testing for those patients who have previously been treated for 
TB or fail to respond to treatment after two months of TB treatment, at 
which point there is a high treatment interruption rate. In addition, 
specialised laboratory facilities are required for such testing. Routine 
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sputum culture and susceptibility testing of all patients suspected as having 
TB should form part of a multi-faceted approach to identifying and 
addressing TB drug resistance.” (Singh 2007: 0020) 
This exposition of the problem presented by XDR-TB leaves little doubt 
about the potential severity of infection with extremely drug-resistant 
forms of the bacillus. Treatment of this condition necessitates between 18 
and 24 months of pharmacotherapy with anti-tuberculous drugs that have 
significant toxicity. The South African Medical Research Council put out a 
press release in 200716, setting out its viewpoint regarding the epidemic 
and the measures necessary to contain the spread of the infection, 
especially the public health measures: 
“Aside from the clinical challenges, management of XDR-TB poses a 
significant challenge to public health practice, especially within the context 
of HIV, given the effective transmission of XDR-TB to HIV-positive individuals 
and the consequent extraordinary high mortality reported. Classical public 
health interventions for infectious diseases aim to contain infection, often 
through quarantine or detention of affected individuals. However, 
protection of public health always comes at a cost to individual rights, 
particularly those around freedom and privacy, creating an inherent 
contradiction in the control of infectious diseases such as XDR-TB. 
In liberal democracies, the power vested in public health legislation is 
generally accepted, ie. the state intervening and limiting individual rights 
when the unlimited exercise of such rights may result in harm to the greater 
community, given the ethical and legal obligations of the state to ensure 
that communities are protected against the consequences of an infectious 
                                                            
16
 This document does not contain details concerning authorship of the opinion expressed although 
queries are directed to Dr Karin Weyer. The press release was made on the 30
th
 January 2007 and is 
available at www.doh.gov.za/docs/pr/2007/pr0130. 
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disease. It is accepted that fundamental individual rights may legally be 
limited by a law of general application that complies with the necessary 
Constitutional safeguards, and public health legislation usually contains 
substantive provisions that override individual rights in order to prevent 
serious risk to public health. Nevertheless, contemporary biomedical ethics 
put strong emphasis on the rights of the individual and on the principles of 
autonomy and self-determination, stressing that any limitation must be 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society, based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, and using the least restrictive 
measures available to accomplish public health goals.” 
This publication goes on to express the view that some of the legislation 
invoked by health authorities in controlling XDR-TB may be 
unconstitutional and remains to be tested for validity. That this has not 
yet happened is surprising, considering the subsequent events in the 
country.  
b. The history of events in South Africa since the identification of 
XDR-TB 
In South Africa, patients identified with XDR-TB have been incarcerated 
against their will for in-patient hospital treatment. This has been reported 
in numerous press articles including the following release in the New York 
Times, published on the 25 March 2008 and written by Celia Dugger 
(2008: March 25) 
PORT ELIZABETH, South Africa — The Jose Pearson TB Hospital here is like a 
prison for the sick. It is encircled by three fences topped with coils of razor 
wire to keep patients infected with lethal strains of tuberculosis from 
escaping. But at Christmas time and again around Easter, dozens of them 
cut holes in the fences, slipped through electrified wires or pushed through 
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the gates in a desperate bid to spend the holidays with their families. 
Patients have been tracked down and forced to return; the hospital has 
quadrupled the number of guards. Many patients fear they will get out of 
here only in a coffin. 
“We’re being held here like prisoners, but we didn’t commit a crime,” 
Siyasanga Lukas, 20, who has been here since 2006, said before escaping 
last week. “I’ve seen people die and die and die. The only discharge you get 
from this place is to the mortuary.” 
Struggling to contain a dangerous epidemic of extensively drug-resistant 
tuberculosis, known as XDR-TB, the South African government’s policy is to 
hospitalize those unlucky enough to have the disease until they are no 
longer infectious. Hospitals in two of the three provinces with the most 
cases — here in the Eastern Cape, as well as in the Western Cape — have 
sought court orders to compel the return of runaways.  
The public health threat is grave. The disease spreads through the air when 
patients cough and sneeze. It is resistant to the most effective drugs. And in 
South Africa, where these resistant strains of tuberculosis have reached 
every province and prey on those whose immune systems are weakened by 
AIDS, it will kill many, if not most, of those who contract it. 
As extensively drug-resistant TB rapidly emerges as a global threat to public 
health — one found in 45 countries — South Africa is grappling with a sticky 
ethical problem: how to balance the liberty of individual patients against the 
need to protect society.  
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It is a quandary that has recurred over the past century, not least in New 
York City, where uncooperative TB patients were confined to North Brother 
Island in the East River in the early 1900s and to Rikers Island in the 1950s.  
In the early 1990s, when New York faced its own outbreak of drug-resistant 
TB, the city treated people as outpatients and locked them up in hospitals 
only as a last resort.  
Most other countries are now treating drug-resistant TB on a voluntary 
basis, public health experts say. But health officials here contend that the 
best way to protect society is to isolate patients in TB hospitals. Infected 
people cannot be relied on to avoid public places, they say. And treating 
people in their homes has serious risks: Patients from rural areas often live 
in windowless shacks where families sleep jammed in a single room — ideal 
conditions for spreading the disease. 
“XDR is like biological warfare,” said Dr. Bongani Lujabe, the chief medical 
officer at Jose Pearson hospital. “If you let it loose, you decimate a 
population, especially in poor communities with a high prevalence of 
H.I.V./AIDS.”  
But other public health experts say overcrowded, poorly ventilated hospitals 
have themselves been a driving force in spreading the disease in South 
Africa. The public would be safer if patients were treated at home, they say, 
with regular monitoring by health workers and contagion-control measures 
for the family. Locking up the sick until death will also discourage those with 
undiagnosed cases from coming forward, most likely driving the epidemic 
underground. 
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“It’s much better to know where the patients are and treat them where 
they’re happy,” said Dr. Tony Moll, chief medical officer at the Church of 
Scotland Hospital in Tugela Ferry. It is running a pilot project to care for 
patients at home. 
Some 563 people were confirmed with extensively drug-resistant TB last 
year in South Africa and started on treatment, compared with only 20 cases 
in the United States from 2000 through 2006. A third of those patients in 
South Africa died in 2007; more than 300 remained in hospitals. 
Further complicating matters, South Africa’s provinces have taken different 
approaches to deciding how long to hospitalize people with XDR-TB. In 
KwaZulu-Natal, the other province with the most cases, the main hospital is 
discharging patients after six months of treatment, even if they remain 
infectious, to make room for new patients who have a better chance of 
being cured. The province is rapidly adding beds, part of a national 
expansion of hospital capacity for XDR-TB. 
“We know we’re putting out patients who are a risk to the public, but we 
don’t have an alternative,” said Dr. Iqbal Master, chief medical officer of the 
King George V Hospital in Durban.” 
This article clearly defines the nature of the problem and the ethical issue 
surrounding public health measures. The question posed is whether it is 
ever justifiable to restrict the autonomy and freedom of the individual in 
order to serve the interests of the community by protecting it from the 
risk of communicable disease. 
Beresford (2006: September 8) writing in the Mail and Guardian 
newspaper in September 2006 defended the policy of isolating XDR-TB 
carriers as follows:  
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“The only way to prevent the spread of XDR TB is to isolate its carriers.  
Mary Edginton of the Wits medical school said urgent attention should be 
paid to public health laws that allow for the quarantining of people with 
diseases posing a public health risk, such as TB.  
In the United States, doctors use similar laws to incarcerate and forcibly 
treat TB patients when it is considered to be in the public interest. South 
Africa has similar legislation, but it does not seem to have been enforced for 
many years, perhaps due to concerns that it is in conflict with the 
Constitution.  
However, some experts say that this is merely a perceived obstacle as the 
Constitution also guarantees communal rights, including protection from 
infection and the right to a safe environment.  
Karin Weyer of the Medical Research Council (MRC) has called for test cases 
to be taken to the Constitutional Court to establish the legal requirements 
for quarantine and compulsory treatment. 
In an MRC policy brief published this year, before the XDR outbreak was 
announced, Weyer called for the enforced hospitalisation of high-risk MDR 
TB patients on the grounds that the risks to society outweigh individual 
rights. But she does not support forcible treatment of MDR TB patients, 
given the dangers and side effects associated with the drugs.  
Edginton said quarantining was critical to curb the disease when some 
people would not or could not take the full course of drugs.  
Even tougher issues are what to do with suspected MDR cases during the six 
weeks it can take for a laboratory to confirm the disease, and how to deal 
with MDR TB patients whom the treatment has failed to cure. Incarcerating 
the latter until they die which could be years would be ethically questionable 
and impractical.” 
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The question needing to be answered is whether involuntary 
hospitalization and loss of freedom and autonomy can be ethically 
defended. 
c. The justifiable limits to personal autonomy when faced with 
infectious diseases 
In dealing with public health issues, the ethical justification for coercive 
action is founded upon utilitarian theory.  
Utilitarian theory    
The notion that the greatest welfare of the greatest number should be the 
sole arbiter of what is morally acceptable has lead to public health policies 
such as vaccination initiatives. These interventions are effective in 
reducing the burden of disease and have a very low statistical risk of 
causing harm to individuals undergoing vaccination. A similar rationale 
could be applied to XDR-TB, arguing that intervention is necessary to 
prevent harm to others and that a few will need to suffer in order to 
secure the safety and health of the vast majority of the population. 
Legitimate state-sponsored intervention, interfering directly in the lives of 
individuals, is mandated even by John Stuart Mill because it will prevent 
harm to others. By utilitarian standards, the consequences of intervention 
are the sole arbiter of what is acceptable; neither the nature of the 
intervention nor the rights of individuals are of any consequence in the 
utilitarian argument. Yet there is clearly a big difference between the two 
situations described: the vaccination policy that carries little risk and 
great benefit versus incarceration of XDR-TB patients for lengthy periods 
of time with no scientific evidence that such measures will have any 
impact on the prevalence of XDR-TB infection among the community. The 
scale of the harm caused to individuals drawn into coercive treatment and 
the scale of benefit accruing from the intervention are very different to 
the example cited concerning vaccination. It seems implausible to think 
that the same arguments should be applied to both situations. If the scale 
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of the intervention and the benefit accruing were irrelevant, a thought-
experiment may be conducted in which a suggestion could be made that 
because HIV-AIDS is such a serious cause of morality and disease in 
Southern Africa, that every identified positive male should be subjected to 
penile amputation in the interests of curbing the epidemic. The harm 
accruing from such a bizarre policy is arguably less than that of 
incarcerating an innocent individual for periods of up to 2 years. Reduced 
to the absurd, the utilitarian argument clearly has limitations founded on 
common morality and the notion that individuals have rights. The 
interests of the majority cannot be exercised at the expense of individual 
rights. This point has also been made by Rachels (2007: 104) in his 
description of the “peeping Tom” whose inclination it was to take 
photographs of an unsuspecting woman who was changing her clothing 
and then circulating the pictures to his colleagues on the police force17. 
The notion that no harm had been done (because the great majority 
derived pleasure from this exercise) could not be sustained when the right 
to individual privacy was considered. 
Deontological ethics 
The Kantian view of the XDR-TB dilemma would be founded upon the 
need to respect the dignity of individuals. A Kantian ethicist would argue 
that the autonomy of individuals is limited only by the need to respect 
others. The risk of harming another being would only become morally 
significant if the action causing harm were consciously and deliberately 
executed. The occurrence of disease and the harm that one individual 
brings to another because of infectious disease cannot necessarily be an 
issue of moral blameworthiness. Those who have no awareness and no 
knowledge of the diseases they have cannot be held accountable for any 
harm they inadvertently bring to others. These considerations do not 
apply to individuals who knowingly put the life and welfare of others at 
                                                            
17
 This case, cited by Rachels (2007: 104), is taken from the records of the U.S. Court of Appeals and can be 
accessed as York v. Story, 1963.  
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risk by virtue of their behaviour. Hence, an HIV-positive man who 
knowingly exposes his partner to the risk of disease without his or her 
consent does so in a morally-blameworthy fashion. Kantians would 
condemn such actions and yet see no reason to intercept those actions 
causing a risk to others; instead they would hold the agent responsible for 
his or her actions and allow him or her to face the consequences: both 
legal and moral.  
A Kantian therefore would see little scope for restricting the autonomy of 
the individual in these circumstances although they would condemn 
actions that deliberately expose others to an increased risk of disease. By 
this account individuals would have responsibility for taking their own 
medication and seeking advice about treatment which may even 
incorporate voluntary quarantine. 
Involuntary incarceration, by Kantian standards would be an exercise in 
which the individual would experience considerable setbacks to his or her 
interests. The categorical imperative indicates that everyone should be 
treated as an end in themselves and not merely as the means to some 
other end. The question then becomes one of whether involuntary 
quarantine for up to two years is “merely the means to some other end” 
and against the autonomous interests of the individual. By the newspaper 
accounts of the actions of those held against their will, the incarceration 
they suffered was not seen by them as being in their own best interests. 
Kantian ethics would therefore condemn such incarceration as morally 
indefensible.  
Kantian ethics therefore defends autonomy of the individual, above all 
else. There is, nevertheless, an expectation that the individual should 
exercise their own moral agency in doing the right thing by way of 
seeking treatment and limiting the risk that may accrue to others. 
Although no Kantian would think it a morally-defensible, generalizable 
principle that any individual should wilfully expose others to a risk of 
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infectious disease, they would also regard any socially-imposed 
restrictions as an indefensible infringement of individual autonomy. In 
these arguments the Enlightenment notion of self-awareness and self-
governance predominate. 
Communitarian philosophy 
The communitarian perspective would have no difficulty arguing the 
restriction of personal autonomy in favour of communal interests. In its 
South African iteration, Ubuntu would require respect and compassion for 
others as well as solidarity with the majority social view. When 
communitarian standards are invoked, medical decisions made by 
individuals may not seem to be in their own best interests because they 
may express the will of the community rather than that of the individual. 
However, what is practiced in South Africa may be philosophically 
consistent with a communitarian view without being the view of the 
community. Certainly those who sought their own freedom by escaping 
from custody had no feeling of solidarity with any communal compulsion 
regarding their management; although the exercise of legal authority is 
the mechanism by which public health interventions are achieved, both 
the laws enacted and those who invoke them do not necessarily derive 
from or, subscribe to, any particular ethical code. 
Principlist ethical reasoning 
From a principlist perspective, competing principles of preventing and 
removing harm to others (beneficence and non-maleficence) would be 
weighed against the need to respect the individual autonomy of those 
identified to be carriers of XDR-TB. Principlists faced with competing 
principles such as these would resort to specification by which the 
applicable moral norms would be further elaborated with particular 
reference to the question at issue. In this case, non-moral aspects of the 
managing XDR-TB would be relevant; any infringement of patient 
autonomy would need medical justification before being morally 
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acceptable. In this context the need for quarantine and the efficacy of 
such measures as a way of preventing the spread of XDR-TB would need 
to be established. This type of information is referred to by the South 
African MRC statement when they allude to conditions for enforced 
hospitalization. This, they argue, must take place within the stipulations 
of the Siracusa Principles (United Nations: 1985) which include, inter alia, 
the criterion that whatever restrictions are imposed upon the freedom of 
individuals should be:  
“......based on scientific evidence and not drafted or imposed arbitrarily, ie. 
in an unreasonable or otherwise discriminatory manner”.  
On the issue of scientific evidence, value judgements need to be made. 
These are imprecise because the nature of medical scientific enquiry is 
that of gathering epidemiological evidence as a basis for inductive 
reasoning about the efficacy of interventions; as such, evidence is always 
a matter of probability and therefore subject to revision as a result of 
accumulating evidence. Evidence that locking-up XDR-TB patients will be 
an effective intervention in preventing the spread of the disease does not 
exist. Singh et al in their article (which actually advocates quarantine) 
quotes the World Health Organizations recommendations regarding multi-
drug resistant TB: they write: 
“WHO recommends that persons with MDR-TB voluntarily refrain from 
mixing with the general public and from those susceptible to infection, while 
they are infectious and in ambulatory care [30]. The document is silent on 
what steps to take should such voluntary measures fail.” (Singh 2007: 
0021) 
In the absence of good evidence that overriding patient autonomy is a 
necessary and effective way of preventing harm to others, principlists 
would not endorse coercive treatment to the point that individuals may be 
asked to surrender their liberty. To the extent that anti-tuberculous 
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therapy may be effective treatment of a communicable infectious disease, 
and in view of the non-maleficence principle, lesser forms of coercion 
would probably be justified by a principlist approach that overrules the 
prima facie respect for autonomy and informed consent. Hence, in the 
same way that vaccination is justified for the prevention of communicable 
disease, involuntary treatment of individuals infected with XDR-TB would 
be acceptable, even if such therapy was associated with a risk of adverse 
effects due to the toxicity of the anti-tuberculous medication. The 
justification for such a stance would be the evidence of drug-efficacy 
(which does exist), the need to protect the un-infected but exposed 
members of society from communicable disease and in the case of the 
affected individual, paternalistic concern for their health welfare. This 
reasoning would, however, only be invoked where informed consent could 
not be elicited from the individual. 
The prevalence of tuberculosis among poor communities also raises issues 
of social justice when considering whether involuntary quarantine can be 
defended. Those who contract tuberculosis are often the poorest 
members of the community and the most susceptible to being further 
disadvantaged by having their liberty curtailed. Singh (2007: 0020) writes 
the following:  
“In the modern era, tuberculosis is recognised as a disease that preys upon 
social disadvantage [23, 24].Thus, the inadvertent deterrent impact that 
health and social welfare policies are having on the hospitalisation of such 
patients needs to be explored. Faced with the prospect of being deprived of 
their gainful employment and / or having their welfare benefits suspended 
for the duration of hospitalisation — which in the case of MDR-TB or XDR-TB 
could last 18 – 24months — many MDR-TB patients opt not to stay in 
hospitals, where their treatment adherence and resistance profile could be 
closely monitored by health personnel.” 
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This insight is echoed by others: Solomon (2007) writing on the subject of 
forced confinement, cites Lisa Schwartz, a McMaster University healthcare 
ethicist and professor of epidemiology. She writes:  
"Historically, the people most likely to be quarantined and have their civil 
liberties taken away are the poor, the marginalized, the less well-off, who 
don't understand the circumstances and have the most to lose by being 
quarantined."  
Not only are the individuals most likely to contract XDR-TB those with the 
lowest personal stakes in the social lottery, but they may also have been 
exposed to the risk of infection as a result of poor social and medical 
services. Singh (2007: 0020) notes:  
“The factors that facilitate the spread of tuberculosis are well known and 
abundantly present in sub-Saharan Africa. Alongside inadequate health care 
system response, poverty and global inequity contribute to the worsening of 
the global TB situation [19, 20]. According to South Africa’s Medical 
Research Council, about half of adults in South Africa with active TB are 
cured each year, compared with 80 % in countries with better resources. 
Moreover, nationally, about 15 % of patients default on the first-line six-
month treatment, while almost a third of patients default on second line 
treatment [21]. This highlights the urgent need for the health system (which 
includes health-care workers) to reinforce the DOTS (directly observed 
treatment, short-course) and DOTS-plus strategy, to revise current 
adherence counselling and public information strategies, and to actively 
promote avoidance of a ‘victim blaming approach’. The emergence of MDR-
TB and XDR-TB is an indicator of the poor implementation of South Africa’s 
TB Control Programme.” 
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The requirements of social justice may be met in different ways; 
libertarians see justice achieved through the conservation of property and 
liberty rights while egalitarians believe that everyone in society should 
have an equal share of certain goods, including health care. John Rawls 
(Beauchamp 1991: 36718) has argued that justice is the “first virtue of 
social institutions”. From the original position, he derives his two 
principles of justice, namely that each person is to have an equal right to 
the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for 
others and secondly that social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are reasonably expected to be to everyone’s 
advantage and attached to positions and offices open to all. By this 
account, injustice consists of inequalities that are not to the benefit of all. 
No-one, asked to adopt the original position behind the veil of ignorance, 
would choose to be exposed to the possibility of indefinite quarantine 
should they happen to contract tuberculosis. No-one operating from 
behind a veil of ignorance would choose to organize state health facilities 
in such a way as to render access to effective anti-tuberculous treatment 
impossible. Yet, those who face involuntary quarantine due to XDR-TB 
face a loss of liberty (and autonomy) partly on the basis of an unjust 
social structure that has failed to arrange the inequalities in social 
services to the advantage of those who benefitted least from the social 
lottery. This situation does not mandate any further loss of individual 
liberty but compounds the social injustice inherent in South African 
society.  
In summary, the classical defence of coercive public measures using 
utilitarian arguments fails on the grounds that the extent of the 
intervention sought against individuals has no precedent and exposes the 
limitations of utilitarian theory where extreme positions, contrary to 
common morality, arise because of its failure to recognise individual 
                                                            
18
 Rawls’ book A Theory of Justice was published by Harvard University Press in 1971. The citation provided 
here refers to extracts from this text, reprinted in Beuachamp’s book Philosophical Ethics published in 
1991.  
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rights. Kantian ethics also fails to justify involuntary quarantine, instead 
making individuals morally responsible for seeking their own treatment 
and in the process refraining from bringing harm to others knowingly. The 
communitarian arguments would support the quarantine of infected 
individuals if that view was held to be representative of communal 
opinion; however, there seems little evidence of that and the acceptance 
of being a member of society encompasses an acceptance of both the 
benefits and burdens of that community. Finally, the principlists would 
find no defence for involuntary quarantine in the absence of convincing 
scientific evidence although lesser interventions of greater scientific 
validity would be endorsed.  
A compromise to the ethical dilemma presented by XDR-TB may lie in 
tolerating some infringement of autonomy founded upon coercive 
treatment of individuals who refuse voluntary intervention; however, 
there seems to be little moral justification for involuntary quarantine. This 
conclusion is not the same as that arrived at by Singh et al who appeal to 
judicial mechanisms as a means of enforcing involuntary isolation. To do 
so, they cite a case on HIV-infected man who indulged in “irresponsible 
and risky” behaviour in Sweden. Following his detention in hospital, the 
man complained to the European Court on Human Rights; Singh (2007: 
0022) writes: 
“The court ruled that the institution of detention for infectious disease must 
be appropriate to the nature of the disease. Where these conditions are 
satisfied, deprivation of liberty is justified, both on grounds of public policy 
and in order to provide medical treatment to the affected party. In ruling in 
favour of the applicant the court found that the compulsory isolation of the 
applicant by Swedish authorities ought to have been considered only as a 
last resort in order to prevent him from spreading HIV after less severe 
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measures had been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the 
public interest.” 
They follow this with a value judgement about XDR-TB:  
“We believe that the forced isolation and confinement of individuals 
infected with XDRTB and selected MDR-TB may be an appropriate and 
proportionate response in defined situations, given the extreme risk posed 
by both strains and the fact that less severe measures may be insufficient to 
safeguard public interest”. (Singh 2007: 0022) 
The example cited by Singh et al is a curious choice because it illustrates 
how the institution and application of rigorous public health legislation 
could lead to un-workable ends. By that standard, many in South Africa 
would run the risk of involuntary detention for any number of disorders 
that could be counted as harmful to others. Hence, many HIV infected but 
sexually active men and women could be detained; those who smoked in 
public places could be detained; those whose consumption of alcohol 
increased the probability of anti-social behaviour could be detained 
against their will: that this is not so rests upon the value judgements of 
those who are in a position to choose whether or not to invoke the powers 
of existing laws.   
Despite these arguments, there are other situations where infectious 
diseases may induce involuntary hospitalization for in-patient care. These 
situations are often those of severe risk to the individual concerned as 
well as members of the public. An example would be quarantine of 
individuals with viral haemorrhagic fever. In these circumstances the risk 
is immediate and overwhelming and the duration of isolation a matter of 
weeks rather than months. Legislation to deal with such emergencies 
needs to be on the statute books and it is a matter of both medical and 
moral judgement whether the provisions of such laws are invoked.  
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Coker (2001: 221), examining the English and American response to 
XDR-TB concludes his assessment with the following remarks:  
“There will always be a need to balance the rights of individuals and the 
need to protect the public health, and there will always be demands for the 
restriction of individuals’ liberty. But we should, I would argue, be cautious 
when we adopt these measures and consider the following points: First, that 
in the case of detention and the control of tuberculosis there is little 
evidence to show that this policy benefits the public health. Second, that 
there is a risk that fundamental human rights may be overridden 
unnecessarily. And third, that coercive practices may act as a smoke screen 
for improved, but more complex or more costly, public health responses to 
the root causes of tuberculosis control failures.”  
He continues:  
“Gostin has described a framework that reflects the Siracusa Principles 
mentioned earlier that tailors them for analysis of public health tools. He 
argues convincingly that, before coercion is justifiable, the risk posed should 
be demonstrable, the proposed interventions should be demonstrably 
effective, and the approach should be cost-effective. In addition, he argues 
that any sanctions should be the least restrictive necessary to achieve the 
purpose and that the policy should be fair and non discriminatory. If we 
scrutinize the policies of detention in New York City and England using these 
human rights principles, I would argue they are not just.” (Coker 2001: 
221) 
I would argue the same is true in South Africa. However, the law here 
(and elsewhere) makes provision for involuntary detention to protect the 
community. That stance is both legally and morally defensible but in the 
application of that law, morally unacceptable infringements of patient 
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autonomy have taken place. This case, unlike the preceding two 
discussions, carries both legal and moral grounds for restricting individual 
autonomy based upon the threat of communicable disease in the 
community, the only exception to this argument being the Kantian view.  
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Limitations of autonomy in South African medical research 
 
The next example concerns the extent to which autonomy rights are 
respected when the welfare of the community may be enhanced by 
acquiring new knowledge through medical experimentation. This is an 
area of social life largely beyond direct legislative control and usually 
regulated by institutional review boards and professional codes of ethics, 
including the Helsinki Declaration (World Health Organization: 1996). In 
the examples cited so far, autonomy has only been legally breached when 
large-scale harm has threatened the community although moral 
arguments would sustain greater limitations to personal autonomy.  
Ethically acceptable medical research depends upon the informed consent 
of those who participate in experiments aimed at establishing the 
scientific validity of hypotheses. Informed consent for any medical 
intervention is an expression of patient autonomy and a necessary 
component of self-governance. In the case of medical research the 
function of consent was initially focussed on preventing harm to those 
exposed to medical experimentation and was only formally spelt out after 
the Nazi war crimes became evident in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 77) have expressed the view that 
the focus has now shifted from protecting the participants from harm to 
that of showing respect for their autonomy. However, the nature of the 
transaction that takes place when informed consent is elicited differs 
considerably between the situation of medical research and the practice of 
clinical medicine. In the latter circumstance, the attending clinician has a 
duty of beneficence to the patient and the patient is encouraged to 
understand his or her circumstances in the light of all the available 
options before electing a course of management that would be of greatest 
benefit. Medical research is predicated on entirely different objectives; 
here the attending clinician is intent upon establishing or refuting a 
hypothesis and, in part, the patient who is recruited to the clinical trial 
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represents a means to that end. Although research is conducted into 
therapeutic avenues that are assumed to have beneficial properties, the 
presumption of beneficial effects is always in question prior to the study. 
Some studies also incorporate the possibility of adverse outcomes. Hence 
the participating research subjects are not faced with the best of the 
available choices but simply a choice of whether or not to participate in a 
programme of treatment that is usually narrowly defined into one of two 
treatment options; of these treatment options, at the very least, the 
experimental treatment will be of unknown efficacy. The research subject 
therefore is faced by a clinician who does not have the sole objective of 
beneficence to the patient and who will then elicit consent to participate in 
clinical research, which does not have to do with selecting the best 
available option for treatment. 
To justify medical research by arguing that it only may take place with 
the informed consent of the patient is dissimulation because the notion of 
informed consent differs between research and clinical environments. The 
procedural aspects of consent are similar but the scope and intentions of 
the consent obtained are different. If the autonomy of research subjects 
is to be fully respected, clinical research may become very difficult, if not 
impossible. The following hypothetical scenario illustrates how difficult it 
may become: consider the situation of a clinician who has a new drug to 
treat hypertension in pregnancy. This clinician wants to test the efficacy 
of the drug in a randomised controlled trial with an experimental arm 
consisting of the new drug and a control group being treated with a well-
established drug of known efficacy. This clinician may then approach one 
of the pregnant patients attending the hospital because of hypertension in 
pregnancy and may ask her to participate in the study. If the question 
were to be phrased as:  
“I have a new drug for treating hypertension in pregnancy that I would 
like to compare with existing treatment because it may be a better drug 
than those we use at the moment and you would be a suitable person to 
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try out the new drug, providing you are happy to do so. This study has 
been approved by our Research Ethics Committee and I can give you 
some more information about how the drug works which we will explain 
to you and will also provide you with a written copy” 
A reasonable number of people are likely to consent to the experiment 
providing their questions have been satisfactorily answered. However, 
should the question be phrased differently, the response may be very 
different:       
“I have a new drug for treating hypertension in pregnancy that I would 
like to compare with existing treatment. We suspect that this new drug 
may be a better drug than those we use at the moment but we really 
don’t know that this is the case. It may also have unexpected side-
effects. Should you decide to help with this study you would have a 50% 
chance of getting the new drug which we are not sure is effective or you 
will receive the standard drug which we always use and know to be 
effective. Should you decide not to participate in this study, you would 
also have a choice of other anti-hypertensive drugs that are not included 
in the study, some of which are also known to be highly effective. This 
study has been approved by our Research Ethics Committee who think 
that finding out whether this new drug is safe and effective is a valid 
scientific question and they are happy that benefit of knowing about how 
effective this drug is outweighs any risk that may be involved in doing the 
study. I can give you some more information about how the drug works 
which we will explain to you and will also provide you with a written copy” 
Given the latter form of counselling, most reasonable people would refuse 
to participate in the clinical trial of this nature unless they had additional 
convictions about the need to foster scientific knowledge and were 
prepared to sacrifice some their own interests in pursuit of this objective.  
Obtaining informed consent as a precondition for medical research is a 
therefore a process that does not necessarily satisfy the objective of 
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allowing individuals to exercise full autonomy. But full autonomous 
decision-making is an ideal rarely, if at all, attainable and substantial 
autonomy may be all that can be achieved. In conceding that some 
infringement of ideal autonomy is likely, how far does this concession 
extend before “informed consent” is a smoke screen for unethical 
practice? Manipulation of research subjects may certainly occur through 
incomplete disclosure and deception, various forms of coercion and 
covertly by virtue of the use of the language of informed consent which 
disguises the true intentions of the researchers from their study subjects. 
The question to be addressed is whether Beauchamp and Childress 
(2001: 77) may have misconstrued the purpose of informed consent for 
medical research because it does not allow the expression of full 
autonomy for the individual; is it merely permission of sorts that at best 
serves to protect the patient through the principle of non-maleficence? Is 
medical research, in fact, a justifiable infringement of patient autonomy? 
A case history will be presented followed by analysis of the preceding 
question 
a. Case history 
Benatar (2002: 1131) has described the situation of a black South African 
woman in the Journal of Social Science and Medicine:  
“Ntombi is in her middle twenties. She has received little if any formal 
education and spends a large part of her day collecting fuel and water, and 
preparing food for the daily survival of her family. Like many rural Africans 
she has no access to electricity or piped water. During her short life she has 
witnessed, and been the victim of, more suffering and misery than any of us 
could imagine or bear. She has lost many of her close family parents, 
siblings and children to violence, poverty, and disease. Despite her 
misfortunes and multiple deprivations she copes with her lot with 
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courageous acceptance, and continues to make contributions to her family 
and her society. Ntombi lives on an annual sum of money approximately 
equivalent to the amount that a person from the modern western world 
lives on for less than a day. She is aware of the disparities in wealth between 
the people within her country. She may also possibly be aware from the 
television set in a local store of the lifestyles of people in other parts of the 
world. Those whom she sees as living comfortable lives are mostly white, 
while those who live like her are mostly black. The differences she sees in the 
other ways of life are awe inspiring, incomprehensible and unimaginable for 
her. Ntombi is pregnant with her third child and is receiving care from a 
local midwife. During her pregnancy a team of health care workers that 
includes people from her own country and others who are visiting from 
abroad approaches her. She is told that there is a significant possibility that 
she is infected with the human immunodeficiency virus and that her child 
may acquire this infection during childbirth or breast-feeding. She is asked if 
she would be willing to be tested for HIV infection and, if positive, to 
participate in a trial of a drug which may reduce the chances of transmission 
of infection to her child. She is also told that she should not breast feed her 
child if she tests positive in order to reduce the risk of transmission. She is 
both bewildered and afraid. She does not feel ill. Who are these people? 
What is their real intention? Why are health care facilities so inadequate in 
her village? Why is such a large team of people with access to seemingly 
vast resources coming to study her? Is it for her benefit or for theirs? How 
will her life change if she discovers she is HIV-positive? What will happen to 
her if she refuses to participate? If she accepts what will happen to her and 
her baby when the study is completed? Will she or her baby really be better 
off as a result of this study? What effect will failure to breast-feed have on 
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her baby? What will her spouse say about her participation in the trial? 
Whom can she ask for answers to these questions? Can she rely on all the 
explanations given by the researchers? Should she consult the leaders she 
respects within her community? Should the community play a role in 
deciding whether its members should participate in the trial, or should she 
decide for herself? If she is encouraged by the research team to decide for 
herself how may this affect her relationship with the community?” 
This case history illustrates many of the difficulties inherent in consent for 
research and especially consent for research in multicultural developing-
countries where the inequities in power between researchers and their 
clients are compounded by differences in social context. 
b. The justifiable limits to personal autonomy in the setting of 
medical research 
Analysis of the preceding case shows firstly that the educational and 
social milieu from which Ntombi came had deprived her of any idea of 
how western medicine is practiced and how scientific knowledge may be 
acquired. Her needs in arriving at an understanding of the proposal put to 
her was much greater than that of any educated person who enters a 
scientific study already able to justify the practice of scientific research. 
Ntombi was provided with no explanation for the proposal put to her other 
than it might prove to be beneficial to her child. Furthermore, those who 
approached her seeking consent for the study were not those she had 
trusted and confided in previously; instead they were a group of strangers 
and people from abroad, whose presence and involvement in her care 
must have been especially puzzling because she had no appreciation of 
what they were trying to achieve. These strangers then proceeded to 
suggest to Ntombi that she may have had HIV infection – a condition of 
which all South Africans will have had first-hand knowledge although 
many uneducated pregnant women may have had little idea that they 
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could pass the infection to their children during childbirth or through 
breastfeeding. This news was imparted to Ntombi without her having yet 
being tested and in a way that she was forced to consider the possibility 
of her unborn child being harmed by an infection which she did not know 
she had - because she was feeling completely well. Having been thus 
intimidated by the threat of inadvertently harming her baby, she was 
asked whether she wished to be tested and to participate in the study. 
This process effectively sought screening and treatment of Ntombi, not for 
her own sake, but in order to accomplish the ends of the study; 
furthermore, linking treatment to participation in the study meant that 
Ntombi was left with few choices if she were to protect her child from this 
hitherto, unforeseen harm. No alternative option of screening and 
treatment was offered to Ntombi and she was also not informed whether 
the trial drug was known to be effective, whether she would definitely get 
the drug or whether there were other ways of preventing infection. 
Ntombi was then also admonished about the risks of breastfeeding; this 
would have been antithetical advice given to a poor South African living in 
rural circumstances where the costs and implications of formula milk 
feeding would make such an intervention unlikely and unaffordable. Not 
only would this be impractical but it would also be completely at odds with 
the customary practices of her community. With this in mind, further 
pressure will have mounted on Ntombi to do what she could to help her 
child who now seemed to be at risk of unexpected illness. Ntombi, 
however, also found herself cut-off from her community where the 
decisions made were communal endorsements. Deviating from communal 
practice was not a common occurrence and here she was expected to 
make an important decision without having the wisdom of her elders 
available to her. 
Ntombi was thus, disempowered in many different ways: at a threshold 
level, her competency to give consent went untested but may have been 
called into question had she elected to refuse the study on the basis of 
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communal pressure. Her understanding of the process of research as well 
as her understanding of the specific research question was inadequate 
because she lacked information. The disclosure of information was far 
short of what was required to allow Ntombi to make a rational decision 
about the study. Finally the process of voluntary decision-making was 
manipulated through coercion because her treatment and that of her child 
was made contingent on her participation in the study with no other 
alternative being offered. She was also not given the option of consulting 
her own social structures, whose views on the proposed study may have 
affected her subsequent relationships within the community. 
Yet, in other circumstances, with other research subjects who may have 
been better educated, the request put to Ntombi may have been sufficient 
to allow an informed decision. Certainly, the request put to Ntombi may 
have fulfilled the legal requirements of informed consent. The moral 
question, however, remains: is informed consent, as an expression of 
patient autonomy and as it is practiced for the purposes of medical 
research, justified? 
Deontological ethics 
The notion of informed consent is based upon the need to respect the 
dignity of individual human beings by according them certain rights 
including the right of self-governance. It is a deontological notion 
defended by Kantian ethics. A Kantian ethicist would not agree with any 
person being used as a means to an end but would insist that any agent 
is also seen as an end in themselves. To be morally acceptable, the 
maxim according to which others are to be treated would also need to be 
universalizable. Where individuals are asked to participate in research 
projects, there would be an expectation that they should be able to 
benefit from their involvement while being given every opportunity to 
decide for themselves whether they wish to be involved. The 
requirements of informed consent would be sought and a Kantian ethicist 
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would not accept any form of manipulation or deceit; telling the truth and 
respecting the dignity of others would require full disclosure without 
coercion. In this case, Ntombi suffered on both these counts and a 
Kantian ethicist could not endorse any process in which the participants 
did not understand the experimental nature and purpose of a clinical 
study. Kantian ethicists would have difficulty defining or accepting 
substantial autonomy as a concept of less than ideal autonomous 
decision-making. 
Utilitarian theory    
A utilitarian approach to eliciting consent for research ethics would focus 
on the consequences of the process; where the benefits of ascertaining 
whether something is of great benefit to the majority of people is 
concerned, utilitarians would focus on the common good rather than the 
possibility of individual disadvantage, providing that any harm accruing to 
individuals was not overwhelming. Rule-utilitarians would create rules 
that served the greatest interest of the majority and some of these rules 
would necessarily protect individuals from exploitation of many different 
kinds. Rule-utilitarian reasoning applied to the situation of Ntombi would 
consider the beneficial consequences of medical research and would, in 
principle, support clinical trials; furthermore, rule-utilitarians may choose 
to accept that research conducted in circumstances where the researchers 
are held accountable for their actions (to research ethics committees and 
the scientific community at large) are likely to be adequately designed to 
ensure that no person is exploited or exposed to undue risk as a 
consequence of the study. Rule-utilitarians may accept that the process of 
obtaining fully informed consent is an onerous, if not impossible task and 
would raise no objections to the idea that only substantial agreement be 
sought for participation in a clinical trial. They would especially endorse 
this view if the process of obtaining consent became an impediment to 
effective research endeavour and prevented the conduct of clinical studies 
that were beneficial to the majority of people.  
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Communitarian philosophy 
Communitarian philosophy, built upon the role of the individual in society 
would expect beneficent contributions to be made by individuals in 
support of their community. In this light, a readiness to participate in the 
training of medical personnel and assistance with the pursuit of medical 
knowledge through clinical research would be a required of everyone 
within the society. The rights of individuals would be secondary to the 
interests of the community. Within this theory, the issue of the virtues 
necessary to fulfil a social role are pertinent, not only in respect of the 
subjects of clinical research but also those of the researcher: the 
motivation for action is considered more morally important than the 
action itself. In this connection, the motivation for carrying out research 
may vary: some will carry out research because they believe in 
benefitting mankind; others will see research as an opportunity for 
establishing and furthering their own reputation and some may see 
research as an opportunity to earn money, the profit motive being further 
augmented by multi-national drug companies who are in the business of 
selling their products. The practice of medicine and the endeavour of 
conducting medical research have the characteristics of a complex, co-
operative socially-established human activity. MacIntyre (1985: 227) has 
spelled out the importance of practices within society, arguing that those 
concerned with standards of excellence and conducted in the service of 
both internal and external goods may function for the wellbeing of the 
community as a whole. In this process, standards of excellence within a 
practice are established by the history and tradition of that practice. In 
the context of medicine, with some exceptions, physicians practice within 
the tradition they inherit, being subject to the standards of excellence of 
those that preceded them and generally serving their patients 
beneficently. Some, however, eschew these traditions and see medicine 
as a means of building personal wealth as a primary aim. The motivation 
of those who engage in research is less evident and it is likely that many 
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seek personal fame or even financial reward from contract research; the 
distinction between clinical practice and research may arise because 
medical research is less closely tied to a tradition of beneficence than 
clinical practice. In Ntombi’s case the motivation for the research is 
obscure and to accept that this was an ethical study, by communitarian 
standards, would have required greater knowledge about the researchers. 
Whatever their persuasion, it is clear that the communitarians would be 
less concerned with issues of autonomy than issues of motivation. 
Communitarian philosophy in the African sense of Ubuntu would require 
solidarity with communal views: a concern illustrated by Ntombi who felt 
isolated from her community, being unable to ascertain their opinion nor 
know how they would react to any decision she might make on her own. 
The very concept of autonomous decision-making through the process of 
informed consent is contradictory to the idea of Ubuntu. That the 
researchers who sought her consent were insensitive to her predicament 
reflects a form of cultural imperialism through which the moral 
presumptions of Western society assume universal applicability. In 
summary, a communitarian approach would endorse less rigorous 
attention to individual personal autonomy providing the motivation of 
those engaged in the research were focussed on communal rather than 
personal benefit; the aspect of Ubuntu adds further emphasis on 
respecting communal views rather than individual perspectives. In this 
particular case, the consent sought was inappropriately pursued without 
understanding the social context of Ntombi and was consequently morally 
indefensible.  
Principlist ethical reasoning 
A principlist examining the situation described would explore the question 
of informed consent as it has already been described. The absence of 
adequate disclosure of information would be the first problem identified: a 
subjective standard would require that a greater amount of information 
be imparted to Ntombi than others who had a better intuitive grasp of 
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medical research; the failure to foster understanding of the issues also 
prevented informed consent from being obtained and finally the issue that 
voluntariness was negated by various attempts at coercive influence also 
prevented informed consent from being obtained. In the latter regard, 
Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 95) caution against overcalling 
manipulative influence by drawing attention to the prevalence of influence 
in everyone’s lives. However, manipulation in pursuit of beneficent 
intervention is different to manipulation where the ends of others are 
being served. A principlist would examine Ntombi’s case and conclude 
that informed consent had not been obtained while still allowing more 
latitude at every level than would be acceptable to a Kantian ethicist. 
In summary, Ntombi’s case represents an example of research consent 
that cannot be regarded as morally acceptable by any argument.  
However, research is held to be morally defensible once the consent of 
the research subjects has been secured. This, ipso facto, encapsulates 
respect for the dignity and autonomy of the individual. The close 
examination of research practices, arguably, reveals that consent for 
research is a legal device with the protection of individuals secured by 
research ethics committees who scrutinize research proposals before they 
are implemented. If this statement is true, then society endorses some 
sacrifice of self-interest on the part of the research subject in order to 
gain knowledge that may be of benefit to many. As such, the autonomy of 
the individual is not held to be of overriding importance but justifiably 
infringed, to some degree.  
Hence, in examining the arguments for the general moral acceptability of 
informed consent obtained prior to medical research, it is clear that with 
the exception of Kantian ethics, the autonomy of the research subject 
carries less weight than other moral considerations related to the overall 
benefit of scientific research.   
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
 
This thesis began with a consideration of how it came to be that individual 
autonomy occupies the central role in contemporary medical ethical 
discourse. In the social milieu of pre-modern man, there was no precept 
of individual consciousness distinct from the social role played by man. 
The practice of medicine was structured on the goodwill of the physician 
whose role it was to exercise the virtue of beneficence and justice in the 
ministry of the sick. The Hippocratic oath refers repeatedly to these 
precepts in phrases such as “I will apply treatment for the benefit of the 
sick according to my ability and judgement; I will keep them from harm 
and injustice”. The precept of beneficent authority associated with 
physicians had currency well into the 20th Century, long after the advent 
of modernity changed what it meant to be a person living among a 
community of other people. Modernity shifted the moral focus from being 
virtuous in service of the community to individual accountability. The 
world was considered what the individual perceived it to be and morality 
was a matter of individual choice. The tradition of medical care, however, 
persisted and faith in the good intentions of the healer remained 
unquestioned until the advent of the Second World War. In the aftermath 
of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the abuse of human subjects for experimental 
purposes by Nazi war criminals was recognized and the need to protect 
individuals from harmful experimentation led to the promulgation of the 
Nuremberg Code which established the need for voluntary consent as a 
pre-requisite to legitimate research. What applied to research influenced 
medical practice which subsequently had to account for what an individual 
might choose to accept as treatment. The autonomous choice of the 
individual became an issue alongside the other more familiar ethical 
principle of physician-beneficence.  
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The third important change in medical ethics (along with physician 
beneficence and individual autonomy) had to do with the expansion of 
technological medicine after the Second World War. This resulted in 
escalating costs of medical care matched to an increasing demand for 
services from an expanding population. Governments and communities 
were faced with the realization that not everything that might be done for 
everyone could be done for everyone. Consequently, rationing and issues 
of a socially-just distribution of resources were added to the medical 
ethical agenda.  
In the wake of the Second World War, beneficence remained the 
dominant principle with social justice being seen as a necessary constraint 
to patient autonomy. Informed consent itself, as an expression of 
autonomy rights, did not enjoy detailed examination until the 1970’s 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2001: 77). When this happened, the aspect of 
disclosure of information concerning an intervention (something a 
beneficent clinician would do) surrendered primacy to the concept that 
the most important aspect of informed consent was to ensure that the 
agent understood and voluntarily consented to the intervention, as an 
expression of autonomous authorization. The ethical priority of the 1970’s 
and 1980’s had to do with treating individual patients in such a way that 
their autonomy was respected before all else. The beneficent physician 
was still expected to behave beneficently but autonomy had to be 
asserted and both beneficence and autonomy were governed to some 
extent by finite resources that had to be seen to be justly distributed. 
Thus autonomy superseded beneficence during the 1970’s while social 
justice remained a moderating influence on both. This view of medical 
ethics, based primarily on the freedom of the individual was consistent 
with Enlightenment philosophy and the tenets of modernity.  
Yet, despite being individually free, in the last century humankind found 
itself living with a legacy of unresolved global poverty amidst great 
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wealth, environmental degradation capable of threatening life and 
persistent moral uncertainty. 
Liberal individualism which allowed unrestrained expression of self-
interest was blamed by some and communitarian views re-surfaced in the 
late 20th century. These views now challenge the idea that man can 
indeed live as he chooses to do without reference to his community, his 
environment or the interests of future generations.  
In medicine, individual autonomy remains the central ethical precept 
although it may now be set against a turning tide of moral philosophy 
which focuses on a growing sense of community-responsibility, the need 
to share fairly and show solidarity with others. Questions brought about 
by rapid changes in new technology, especially genetic technology, have 
also raised ethical questions that can only be answered with reference to 
ideas that take no account of individual autonomy as the cornerstone of 
bioethics. More will be said about genetic technology presently. This 
thesis set out to examine the role of autonomy as an ethical principle in 
South African medical practice. It does so by describing its role in 
determining what ought to be done and by exploring the justifiable limits 
to its application. 
The thesis began with a conceptual analysis of autonomy. Moral 
autonomy as a form of inescapable individual accountability was 
distinguished from personal autonomy. Personal autonomy was described 
as an attribute of man, legitimately limited in various ways including the 
need to refrain from harming others as well as accepting and sacrificing 
personal needs in order to serve the interests of others. In doing this, 
social justice became a focus and our nascent understanding of 
responsibility for the welfare of our community was fostered. In the 
practice of medicine, each of these has played a role in shaping the 
morally-acceptable limitations to individual autonomy.  
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Several clinical scenarios were examined in the light of the prevailing 
moral theories to establish whether autonomy remains the dominant 
concern of ethical deliberation or whether there are existing or changing 
perceptions about the limits of self-governance in medical practice. The 
moral theories applied included deontological ethics, exemplified by 
Kantian theory: this philosophy is a direct expression of Enlightenment 
philosophy with its emphasis on freedom of the individual and underpins 
the notion of civil rights and the liberal-individualist society. Utilitarian 
theory was born of the rejection of divine moral authority as well as rule-
based and abstract morality; utilitarianism solely sought happiness and 
the alleviation of suffering. It too, was a creation of modernity and a tool 
of social reform (Rachels 2007: 91). The application of utilitarian theory, 
however, was based upon the quantum of greatest good which sometimes 
led to the sacrifice of individual interests. Communitarian philosophy was 
the third theory applied to the ethical problems presented. This theory 
may be viewed as a reconnection with pre-modern traditions in which 
morality was a function based upon social obligation; it is a philosophy of 
growing significance given the plethora of social issues facing modern 
man. Finally, the cases presented were examined in the light of a 
principlist approach through which prima facie principles intermediate 
between moral principles and rules are applied to moral issues in order to 
evaluate the conflicting claims of individuals facing moral dilemmas. 
These principles are derived and modified by both deductive and inductive 
reasoning, appealing to a range of moral theories and relying on casuistry 
for specification. This approach is prevalent in bioethical reasoning and 
although describing only prima facie principles, individual autonomy 
remains arguably the most significant of the principles to be applied.  
Kantian ethics, in each and every case described, stood resolutely against 
any infringement of individual autonomy. The case of the psychiatrically-
ill woman did not merit any infringement of her autonomy for as long as 
she was able to make rational decisions. The woman seeking abortion 
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retained her right to make whatever decision she chose to make not 
because a Kantian would want anyone to choose to harm another being 
but because others needed to respect the autonomous agency of the 
woman and to allow her the opportunity of choosing to do the right thing 
or to pursue some less defendable course for which she would be held 
both morally and legally accountable. The XDR-TB patients would not be 
held morally blameworthy for the harm they may unconsciously bring to 
others and incarceration of people infected with XDR-TB would judged as 
using certain individuals as a means to further the ends of others. XDR-TB 
patients would remain morally responsible for their own treatment but 
their autonomy and freedom to choose (treatment or voluntary 
quarantine) remain absolute. Finally, the issue of research and informed 
consent for research would allow no manipulation of individuals or their 
use to achieve the ends of others. Research subjects would need to 
willingly and freely accept the terms under which studies were conducted 
and no lesser consent would satisfy a Kantian ethicist. Kantians, therefore 
would rigidly support individual autonomy as a central tenet of respect for 
the dignity of individual human beings.  
Utilitarian theory, applied to the first case of psychiatric detention 
formulated answers that allowed autonomy to be restricted in the case of 
antisocial behaviour with temporary restriction of autonomy in cases of 
attempted suicide. The abortion question would be resolved in favour of 
the pregnant woman, not because it happened to be her autonomously 
expressed wish but because the greatest balance of happiness happened 
to coincide with the pregnant woman’s wishes and under different 
circumstances the same moral reasoning may have resulted in a different 
outcome. In this regard, utilitarian theory is distinguished from 
deontological theory which would always defend a matter of principle 
without any regard for circumstances or consequences. The XDR-TB case 
would find no issue with infringing individual autonomy in the interests of 
the majority and the same would apply to the benefits of medical 
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research that may only be practicable if the standard of consent is set at 
a reasonable level and if there is a general expectation that research is 
necessary to sustain society in the face of new medical technology and 
challenges. Utilitarian theory therefore, as expected, provides a moral 
basis for discerning what may be acceptable in a number of situations 
without any categorical assertion of autonomy rights. 
Communitarian philosophy applied to each of these situations would 
support intervention in the case of the psychiatrically-ill woman as an 
intervention carried out by others in terms of accepted social practices 
aimed at protecting the community and fostering the interests of the 
individual, not as a paternalistic exercise, but in the context of exercising 
virtue in support of others. The will of the individual would be secondary 
to communal concern. In the abortion case, the question was examined 
from the perspective of the pregnant woman whose life history could not 
have been scripted to include an unwanted pregnancy due to rape and 
the intentions and virtues of the medical team providing care were seen 
to be conducted in a manner consistent with accepted practice and with 
good motivation. Hence the will of the pregnant woman was supported, 
because it was consistent with communal understanding of who she was 
and what the community would be prepared to offer her. The XDR-TB 
case would have raised no objections to management that was deemed to 
be in the interests of the community and the same considerations are 
applicable to the question of research. However, in both cases what the 
community endorsed was unknown and may have been at odds with what 
was being done. Hence a communitarian approach in the South African 
context would endorse views that led to a morally-acceptable 
infringement of personal autonomy although the views of the community 
seem to have no impact on South African society.  
The principlist approach retains a deontological approach but seeks 
justification for overruling conflicting principles in order to arrive at a 
solution. Hence, principlists avoided addressing the issue of autonomy in 
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the psychiatric case by questioning the patient’s competence. With regard 
to suicide they would defend a policy of beneficent intervention, 
overruling the autonomy of the pregnant woman, partly in support of the 
social symbolism arising from being seen to help others. The abortion 
case-history shows how principlists could endorse conflicting responses to 
the autonomy of the pregnant woman and how non-maleficence to the 
fetus may justify overriding maternal autonomy. In both the remaining 
scenarios, treating XDR-TB and eliciting research consent, the latitude 
derived from using prima facie principles means that in every case to 
some degree individual autonomy may be overridden. Informed consent 
in the case of principlist reasoning is based upon substantial autonomy 
and XDR-TB patients may be reasonably expected to accept treatment 
against their will for the benefit of others and to fulfil the requirements of 
non-maleficence.      
In summary, each of the theories presented stands in contradistinction to 
deontological theory that recognizes no limitation to autonomy because it 
sees the capacity for moral action arising only from the free will of 
individual human beings. Each of the other theories focuses to some 
extent on the individual in society and the possibility of right action in a 
social context. Each of the other theories is able to justify some restriction 
to individual autonomy by virtue of the interests of others.  
Liberal individualism, the prevalent Western philosophy is evident also in 
contemporary South African law; in the cases presented, it is clear that 
both the Mental Health Act and the abortion legislation prioritize the 
autonomy and freedom of the individual. The South African law is more 
consistent with a deontological view than communitarian perspectives. 
But issues of social importance are increasingly being brought into 
question by global socio-economic inequality and environmental 
degradation which puts the survival of the species at risk. The notion of 
conserving resources to support future generations is currently seen as 
providing a limit to what man may now exploit simply because he can. 
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Clearly, there are justifiable limits to individual autonomy conditioned by 
the need to respect the legitimate interests of others. In medicine, the 
cost of technological medicine has already challenged society over issues 
of social justice and rationing of scarce resources is an inescapable 
priority in all countries of the World. These limitations have to do with the 
division of resources between members of an existing community. The 
limitations placed upon the individual choices we seek to make may be 
further limited by our responsibility to future communities of men and 
women. 
New technology has brought new questions about who we are and what 
we may become. This is especially evident in the new genetic 
technologies. Genetic technology has allowed us to identify those at risk 
of diseases long before they have any manifestations of disease; they 
have also expanded the possibilities of therapeutic intervention in existing 
diseases and have made possible future manipulation of human 
characteristics through genetic engineering involving germ cell DNA. The 
possibility of manipulating and potentially improving the human genome 
brings into focus the benefits and risks of such interventions that may be 
borne by future generations; hence, the responsibility we now face is no 
longer just one of self-governance but the need to have a broader 
conception of the good of man and to bear responsibility for the survival 
of our species. In this way, the power of the new genetic technologies 
also challenges our conception of ourselves as a species. Dyer (1997: 
172), writing about the ethics of human genetic intervention notes the 
following:  
“One of the things that can be said about modern medical ethics is that it is 
focused on the individual. The centrality of autonomy in bioethics is a 
reflection of the importance modern (Western) civilization has placed on the 
individual. One of the things we might anticipate changing is that 
individualism. We might become, for example, more concerned with the 
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health of the population (public health) than the health of the individual. 
This change could be economic and probably will be economic. For example, 
genetic alteration might be given strong economic incentive if the cost of 
treating a genetic anomaly (let us imagine addictive propensities) 
outweighed the cost to society of altering such traits genetically.”  
This prediction is already true of resource-intensive Western medicine and 
will probably become equally true of genetic technology, once it is fully 
incorporated into clinical medicine. Dyer (1997: 171) further structures 
his argument on the development of a post-modern world which he 
describes as meaning different things to different people. To some it is a  
“..liberation from restraints of tradition, an opportunity to start over, a 
shattering of old conventions, of form, of language, and of epistemology, 
particularly the epistemology of objectivist science”.  
For others however, it represents  
“..a more humanistic reconnection with the traditions of the past, a linkage 
with human forms and styles that prevailed before the more sterile 
mechanisms of the modern era”. (Dyer 1997: 171)   
To which Giddens (1991: 52) would reply that post-modernity is the 
radicalization of changes that began with the European Enlightenment. 
The confidence in our own powers that emerged during the Enlightenment 
(Barth’s ‘absolute’ man of the 18th Century) changed as his world around 
him was changed by him. The consequences of modernity have been 
profound in every respect, none more so than the “presumption of 
wholesale reflexivity” (Giddens 1991: 39) and our loss of certainty about 
what it is we know. These realizations may be sufficient reason to 
reconsider the certainty with which we exercise our own autonomous will. 
However, the other consequence of modernity with more far-reaching 
implications for the autonomy of individuals is that of time and space 
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distantiation which has led to the creation of a global community. The 
Enlightenment ideal that we are morally accountable to one another for 
who we are and how we behave retains its authority. But this alone 
cannot provide answers for a complex modern world in which the lives of 
individuals are set in a global community and increasingly inter-
dependent. In asserting our right to self-governance, the justifiable limits 
to our autonomy extend beyond those that may cause direct harm to 
others. What we choose should be consistent with the welfare of the 
broader community, the planet and future generations.  
In conclusion, South African medicine does not yet seem to be at the 
cross-roads represented by the transition from modernity into ‘post-
modernity’ although the ethical challenges of new technology will 
doubtless slowly intrude upon the ordinary clinical practice of medicine. 
The moral challenges confronting the South African community still 
consist in meeting the challenge presented by the claims of absolute 
individual authority confronted by the need to accept the demands of 
social justice and the legitimate role of communitarian opinion. In this 
process individual autonomy is necessarily and justifiably limited.    
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